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Australia’s Experience with Foreign Direct Investment 
by State Controlled Entities: A Move Towards 
Xenophobia or Greater Openness? 
Greg Golding 
Over the last few years, there has been considerable debate in Aus-
tralia as to the appropriate regulation of foreign direct investment by 
entities affiliated with foreign governments. During that time, Australia 
has been a significant beneficiary of investment by sovereign wealth 
funds from many foreign jurisdictions, particularly by Chinese state 
owned enterprises. The Australian government, similar to governments 
of many developed Western countries, has struggled to properly cali-
brate its policy settings for regulating this type of investment activity. 
This Article considers the Australian regulatory regime and assesses 
Australia’s experience in regulating those investment flows during this 
period. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, a growing global de-
bate has focused on the appropriateness of restrictions on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by entities controlled in some way by foreign govern-
ments. It is no surprise that this debate has coincided with the rise in 
economic power of the BRIC
1
 nations, national insecurities arising from 
the spread of global terrorism, and the challenges of the global financial 
crisis in the period following the worldwide economic collapse of 2007. 
Australia is at the epicenter of this debate. In the early stages of the 
global financial crisis, the role of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) came 
under increasing scrutiny as SWFs invested heavily outside their home 
                                                     
 
 Partner, King & Wood Mallesons, Sydney. 
 1. BRIC stands for Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
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local jurisdictions, particularly in struggling financial institutions.
2
 Fur-
ther, as a once-in-a-generation resources boom developed in Australia, 
increased interest in Australian investment from Chinese state owned 
enterprises (SOEs) posed certain challenges, particularly when consid-
ered in the context of the developing Australia–China trade relationship. 
The purpose of this Article is to assess the effectiveness of the Aus-
tralian regulatory regime in addressing the policy challenges posed by 
SWF and SOE foreign direct investment in Australia. 
II. THE STATE OF THE FDI DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA 
Australia has a long history of economic growth facilitated by FDI: 
In the early part of the twentieth century and in the decades following the 
Second World War, foreign investment helped fund the expansion of the 
infrastructure required to support Australia’s rapidly growing population. 
This period of economic growth extended through the 1970s when for-
eign investment assisted the development of some of Australia’s now-
key mineral resource projects.
3
 
The significance of foreign investment to Australian growth arises 
from the historically low level of savings in the Australian economy. Ac-
cess to foreign investment, particularly in capital-intensive areas such as 
the resources sector, has enabled Australia to achieve a higher rate of 
economic growth than would otherwise be the case.
4
 Competition for the 
limited capital within Australia to fund growth would increase the cost of 
capital by driving up interest rates and result in slowed rates of invest-
ment and growth. Impeding or blocking FDI can also be expected to de-
                                                     
 
 2. Those investments in late 2007 and early 2008 included a US$10 billion investment by 
Singapore General Investment Corporation in UBS; a US$3 billion investment by Temasek in Bar-
clays; a US$5 billion investment by China Investment Corporation in Morgan Stanley; a US$7.5 
billion investment by Abu Dhabi Investment Authority; a US$7 billion investment by Singapore 
General Investment Corporation in Citigroup; a US$4.4 billion investment by Temasek; a US$2 
billion investment by Korean Investment Fund; and a US$2 billion investment by Kuwait Invest-
ment Fund in Merrill Lynch. As the global financial crisis developed, the role of SWFs as investors 
was replaced by direct investment by governments to stabilize the international financial system, 
leading to partial or full nationalization of a number of financial institutions. 
 3. For an overview of the historical contribution of FDI in Australia, see Brian Fisher et al., 
The Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment and the Mining Industry to Welfare of Australians 
(Comm. for the Econ. Dev. of Austl., Information Paper No. 92, 2008), available at https://www.ced 
a.com.au/research-and-policy/research/2009/11/infopapers/ip_92. 
 4. It has been suggested that during the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, when trade 
and investment were negatively affected by a restrictive foreign policy and other protectionist poli-
cies, capital productivity declined by 30%. See Ted Evans, Sec’y to the Treasury, Speech at the 
Ninth Annual Colin Clark Memorial, Economic Nationalism and Performance: Australia from 1960s 
to the 1990s 7–10 (June 3, 2009) (Austl.), available at http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/eserv.php?pid= 
UQ:10449 &dsID=econ_dp_258_99.pdf. 
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press the expected returns from investing in host-country assets. A host-
government veto of a proposed FDI signals to potential foreign investors 
that they will have to deal with only residents of that country in a future 
sale, thus reducing the potential pool of future purchasers.
5
 
Foreign investment has also had spillover benefits for Australian 
businesses, including technology transfer and improved management 
expertise.
6
 These forms of intangible capital are difficult to quantify but 
are believed to have positive implications for domestic economic welfare 
and yield productivity gains. Foreign investment also contributes to the 
strength of Australia’s trade relationships
7
 and can help to reduce securi-
ty risks through the development of strong political and economic rela-
tionships between investing nations.
8
 
The general benefits of FDI are recognized and advanced globally 
through principles adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).
9
 The OECD advances the general 
principle that foreign investment should be treated in the same way as 
domestic investment. This principle is recognized by the OECD Code of 
Liberalization of Capital Movements, first enacted in 1961,
10
 and the 
                                                     
 
 5. See Dave Heatley & Bronwyn Howell, Overseas Investment: Is New Zealand ‘Open for 
Business’?, NEW ZEALAND INST. STUDY COMPETITION & REGULATION, 11 (June 21, 2010),  
http://www.iscr.org.nz/n578.html. 
 6. Stephen Kirchner, Capital Xenophobia II: Foreign Direct Investment in Australia, Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and the Rise of State Capitalism, CENTRE INDEP. STUD., 2 (Nov. 1, 2008), 
http://www.cis.org.au/images/stories/policy-monographs/pm-88.pdf (Austl.). 
 7. Rio Tinto, as a recipient of significant foreign direct investment into assets it owns, has 
commented that Japan’s investment in its Robe River operations helped to underpin rapid growth in 
its Robe River production and its sales to Japan. See Rio Tinto, Foreign Investment: A Foundation 





missions/sub47_pdf.ashx (submission to the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 
Inquiry into Foreign Investment by State-Owned Entities). 
 8. KATHRYN GORDON & APRIL TASH, OECD, FOREIGN GOVERNMENT–CONTROLLED 
INVESTORS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRY INVESTMENT POLICIES: A SCOPING PAPER 7 (2009) (Fr.), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/42022469.pdf. 
 9. Australia is one of the thirty-four member countries of the OECD. Members and Partners, 
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 10. OECD, CODE OF LIBERALISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (2013), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/CapitalMovements_WebEnglish.pdf. In accordance 
with Article 1 of the Code, member states shall progressively abolish between one another re-
strictions on movements of capital to the extent necessary for effective economic cooperation, in-
cluding, without limitation, treating all nonresident-owned assets in the same way irrespective of the 
date of formation. Members shall endeavor to extend those principles to all members of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. 
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OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enter-
prises, first enacted in 1976.
11
 
In advancing this principle, the OECD also recognizes the interna-
tional legal precept that governments are entitled to protect their national 
security. National security may be threatened by foreign non-commercial 
investment in sensitive areas. As such, it is accepted that foreign invest-
ment regulation may be appropriate where national security might be at 
risk. The relevant OECD Council
12
 has recommended that where a recip-
ient country imposes restrictions on foreign investment for national secu-
rity reasons, such measures should be formulated narrowly so that the 




It is an unfortunate political reality in Australia that many members 
of the general population have a negative attitude toward FDI and do not 
appear to appreciate the economic benefits derived from access to such 
investment. A Lowy Institute Poll of Australians’ opinions on foreign 
direct investment reported that 90% of those surveyed believed that the 
Australian government has a responsibility to keep Australian companies 
under majority Australian control.
14
 Further, 85% of those surveyed said 
that investments by companies controlled by foreign governments should 
be more strictly regulated than investments by foreign private investors.
15
 
The key criticisms leveled against Australia’s foreign investment 
regime are a lack of transparency and accountability. The foreign in-
vestment review process in Australia is inherently political in its ultimate 
decision making. The Treasurer is not required to publish reasons for 
decisions, and there is no system of appeal after a decision is made. 
                                                     
 
 11. OECD, DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES (2011) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/Consolidated 
DeclarationTexts.pdf. The Declaration provides guidelines of good practice regarding government 
conduct in relation to multinational enterprises. “National Treatment,” Item II of the Declaration, 
requires that adhering governments should, among other things, “consistent with the need . . . to 
protect their . . . interests,” accord to enterprises operating in their territories and owned by foreign 
nationals treatment under their laws that are no less favorable than treatment “accorded in like situa-
tions to domestic enterprises.” Id. at 5. 
 12. In this context, the relevant council is the OECD Council on Recipient Country Investment 
Policies Relating to National Security. 
 13. OECD, GUIDELINES FOR RECIPIENT COUNTRY INVESTMENT POLICIES RELATING TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY (2009) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/433 
84486.pdf. 
 14. FERGUS HANSON, THE LOWY INSTITUTE POLL 2008: AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD: PUBLIC 
OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY 6–7 (2008), available at http://lowyinstitute.org/files/pubfiles/Lowy_ 
Poll08_Web1.pdf. 
 15. Id. 
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III. GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ENTITIES: SWFS AND SOES. 
A. What Is An SWF, and What Special Concerns Arise? 
An SWF is defined as a special purpose investment fund or other 
arrangement that is owned by a general government.
16
 SWFs are not new 
as an asset class. The oldest SWF, the Kuwait Investment Authority, was 
established in 1953. In recent years, the number of SWFs has proliferat-
ed. There are now SWFs in many parts of the world, including Austral-
ia.
17
 SWFs are currently estimated to hold assets of approximately 
US$5.2 trillion,
18
 and this is expected to grow significantly in the coming 
years. 
SWFs cover a broad range of investment vehicles, investment ob-
jectives, and governance structures. Some of the different types of SWFs 
include the following: 
 Revenue stabilization funds,19 
 Future generation savings funds,20 
 Holding funds,21 and 
 General SWFs.22 
 
                                                     
 
 16. INT’L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: 
GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 3, 27 (2008) [herein-
after SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.  
 17. The Future Fund and Queensland Investment Corporation are Australian examples of 
SWFs. 
 18. THECITYUK, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 2013, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.thecit 
yuk.com/research/our-work/reports-list/sovereign-wealth-funds-2013/. This report states that there is 
an additional US$7.7 trillion held in other sovereign investment vehicles, such as pension reserve 
funds and development funds. Id. 
 19. Revenue stabilization funds are designed to cushion the impact of commodity price vola-
tility on fiscal revenues. Examples include the Russian Reserve Fund, Kuwait Reserve Fund, and 
Mexico Oil Stabilization Fund. 
 20. Future generation savings funds are investments of national wealth intended to be held over 
long timeframes. Funding sources are typically commodity or fiscal based. They are generally ear-
marked for particular purposes, e.g., future pension liabilities. Examples include Australia’s Future 
Fund, the Norway Government Pension Fund, and the Kuwait National Prosperity Fund. 
 21. Holding funds constitute management of government direct investments in companies and 
generally support government development strategies. Examples include Temasek, the China In-
vestment Corporation, and the Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund. 
 22. General SWFs cover one or more of the above-listed examples and typically manage gov-
ernment excess wealth. Examples include the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and the Singapore 
Government Investment Corporation. 
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FDI by SWFs gives rise to various policy concerns for recipient coun-
tries, particularly with respect to an SWF’s potential impact on financial 
stability, political motivations, and national security. 
The debate regarding financial stability centers around the fact that 
the governance arrangements surrounding SWFs and their operations 
may be unregulated and lack transparency. Due to the size and financial 
capacity of some SWFs, there are concerns that a lack of transparency 
may mean that investment decisions made by SWFs could have destabi-
lizing effects on financial systems.
23
 On the other hand, some commenta-
tors suggest that SWFs actually have a stabilizing effect on the financial 
system by virtue of their long-term investment horizon, generally unlev-
eraged positions, and capacity to enhance the depth and breadth of mar-
kets they serve. There is little, if any, evidence of investments being 
made by SWFs for political rather than commercial purposes.
24
 
Due to the potential influence the state may have over the opera-
tions and investment decisions of SWFs, there is a concern that SWFs 
may exercise its control over recipient companies for political rather than 
commercial purposes. There is also a concern that the closeness between 
an SWF and the government of the SWF’s country may give that entity 
privileges and advantages that are not available to other enterprises. Fi-
nally, there is concern that foreign governments may obtain access to 
information or technology through the investments of SWFs, which 
jeopardizes the recipient country’s national security.
25
 
In view of some of these concerns, an International Working Group 
(IWG) of SWFs was established by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 2008.
26
 The working group drafted a set of generally accepted 
principles reflecting agreed upon investment practices and objectives.
27
 
                                                     
 
 23. See Sovereign Wealth Funds–A Work Agenda, INT’L MONETARY FUND, 4, 13 (Feb. 29, 
2008), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf. 
 24. There is no example of an SWF exercising decision making in a way that has compromised 
national security in any country in five decades. DAVID M. MARCHICK & MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SPECIAL REPORT NO. 34, GLOBAL FDI POLICY: CORRECTING A 
PROTECTIONIST DRIFT 27 (2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/global-fdi-
policy/p16503. 
 25. Id. 
 26. The development of the Santiago Principles was undertaken by the International Working 
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, which comprised twenty-six member states of the IMF (includ-
ing Australia) with SWFs. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 1. 
 27. The drafting committee was led by Mr. David Murray, then-Chairman of Australia’s Future 
Fund. Id. 
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In October 2008,
28
 the Santiago Principles were voluntarily adopted as a 
set of SWF best practice objectives. 
The Santiago Principles have attempted to address these concerns 
in various ways. While there are thirty-four principles and sub-principles 
comprising the Santiago Principles, some of the key principles are as 
follows: 
 SWFs should have clearly defined policy purposes29 and clear 
and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or arrange-




 SWFs should have sound governance arrangements and clear 






 The activities of SWFs should be conducted in compliance with 
applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the coun-
tries in which they operate.
33
 
 The investment decisions of SWFs should be aimed to maxim-
ize risk-adjusted financial returns
34
 without seeking or taking 
advantage of privileged information or inappropriate influence 
by the broader government.
35
 
 The exercise of ownership rights by SWFs in investments 
should be consistent with investment policies.
36
 
B. Distinguishing SWFs and SOEs 
SWFs and SOEs differ in function as well as purpose. An SOE can 
be defined as a commercial enterprise of which the state has significant 
control through full, majority, or significant minority ownership.
37
 
                                                     
 
 28. Press Release, Int’l Working Grp. of Sovereign Wealth Funds, International Working 
Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds Presents the “Santiago Principles” to the International Monetary 
and Financial Committee (Oct. 11, 2008), available at http://www.iwg-swf.org/pr/swfpr0806.htm. 
 29. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 16, at 7 (GAPP 2). 
 30. Id. (GAPP 4) 
 31. Id. (GAPP 6). 
 32. Id. at 7–8 (GAPP 9). 
 33. Id. at 8 (GAPP 15). 
 34. Id. (GAPP 19). 
 35. Id. (GAPP 20). 
 36. Id. at 9 (GAPP 21). 
 37. OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES 11 
(2005) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporateaffairs/soe/guidelines. The preamble 
further notes that SOEs are often prevalent in utilities and infrastructure industries whose perfor-
mance is of great importance to broad segments of the population. The rationale for state ownership 
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While the following is a gross simplification, SWFs tend to make 
portfolio or indirect investments through investment funds, whereas 
SOEs typically make more commercially strategic investments to gain 
synergies, economies of scale, or otherwise supplement or support their 
commercial operations. Many developing countries, particularly BRIC 
nations, have pursued growth through the establishment of SOEs to par-
ticipate in key industries.
38
 
C. The Particular Case of Chinese SOEs 
Economic reform in China over the last two decades has been driv-
en by government reliance on the establishment and development of 
SOEs.
39
 Chinese SOEs are typically classified as enterprises “owned by 
the Chinese government, and thus, by the whole people”
40
 of China. 
Ownership rights are exercised by the State Council,
41
 the highest execu-
tive organ of the Chinese government. Most of the Council’s powers 
have been delegated by legislation to the State Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). 
Chinese SOEs are established under Chinese law as separate legal 
enterprises from the Chinese government with separate legal identities. 
SOEs have their own individual operating assets, financial resources, 
management teams, and workforces. Each SOE has autonomy from the 
Chinese government in operational policies. 
Chinese law precludes SASAC from interfering in the daily opera-
tions and business activities of SOEs; however, these limitations are sub-
ject to SASAC’s broad discretion to exercise its “contributor’s func-
tions.” This means that SASAC, on behalf of the Chinese government, 
enjoys the right to “return on assets, participation in major decisions, 
[and] selection of managers.” In particular, each shareholder representa-
 
varies among countries and has typically composed of a mix of social, economic, and strategic inter-
ests. Id. at 9. 
 38. THECITYUK, supra note 18, at 7. 
 39. In 2007, it was estimated that there were approximately 115,000 SOEs in China. Press 
Release, State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin. Comm’n [SASAC], General Information on 
Reform and Development of SOEs over the Past Five Years Since the Establishment of SASAC 
(Aug. 10, 2008) (China), available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n2964712/5349959.html. 
 40. Qi ye guo you zi chan fa (中华人民共和国企业国有资产管理法) [Law on the State-
Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 
2008, effective May 1, 2009)  art. 3 (China), available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1566/n11 
183/n11244/5751091.html. 
 41. Interim Regulations on Supervision and Management of State-Owned Assets of Enterprises 
(promulgated by the State Council, effective May 27, 2003) art. 4 (China), available at 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2963340/n13933222/13934025.html. 
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tive appointed by SASAC to an SOE is required by law to present opin-
ions and exercise voting rights according to the instructions of SASAC.
42
 
There is little evidence that Chinese SOEs operating offshore have 
engaged in non-commercial behavior.
43
 In 2009 at the Senate Economics 
Committee’s inquiry into foreign investment by SWFs and SOEs, the 
Executive Member of the Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) 




When any Chinese domestic enterprise—in such capacity as an 
SOE, a privately owned enterprise (POE), or a foreign-owned investment 
enterprise (FIE)—proposes to make a particular investment outside of 
China, it must obtain approvals from Chinese governmental bodies prior 
to making that investment. Approval is sought after the investment deci-
sion has been made by the relevant enterprise, and it must be obtained 
from the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and 
the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). The NDRC and MOFCOM 
each apply the same standards to and impose the same requirements on 
all Chinese commercial entities seeking offshore investment approval 
(regardless of whether they are an SOE, a POE, or a FIE). 
Before the investment approval process begins, the NDRC conducts 
a preliminary review to confirm that there is no “material adverse fac-
tor.”
45
 The NDRC and MOFCOM each consider applications for off-
shore investment approval in accordance with the provisions of the 
Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalogue 
and the relevant regulations on the examination and approval of overseas 
investment projects.
46
 Once approvals are received from NDRC and 
                                                     
 
 42. The Law on the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises, supra note 40, at art. 13. 
 43. John Larum & Jingmin Qian, A Long March: The Australia–Chinese Investment Relation-
ship, AUSTRALIA CHINA BUS. COUNCIL, 12 (Oct. 5, 2012), http://acbc.com.au/deploycontrol/files/ 
upload/news_nat_fdi_report_oct.pdf. 
 44. Senate Economic References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Foreign 
Investment by State-Owned Entities, Hearing Transcript (June 22, 2009) E4 (Patrick Colmer, Gen-
eral Manager of the Foreign Investment and Trade Policy Division) (Austl.), available at 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/12158/toc_pdf/69252.pdf;fileTy
pe=application%2Fpdf#search=%22(()%20committees)%20economics%20references%20committe
e%20senator%20joyce%22 (“While there is a much greater formal link between a Chinese company 
and the Chinese government, what we see, by and large, is a fair degree of overt commercial behav-
ior on the part of the Chinese companies seeking to invest in Australia.”). 
 45. Notice of the National Development and Reform Commission on Issues Concerning the 
Improvement of the Administration of Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. 
& Reform Comm’n, effective June 8, 2009) (China), available at http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/ 
zcfbtz/2009tz/t20090619_286696.htm. 
 46. See Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment Guidance Catalog (promulgated by 
the Ministry of Commerce & the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, effective July 8, 2004) CHINA L. & 
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MOFCOM, applications must be made to the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) for the purpose of foreign exchange registra-
tion relating to such offshore investment. Approval for offshore invest-
ment by an SOE must also be obtained from SASAC. 
The NDRC is primarily concerned with reviewing the size and na-
ture of the proposed offshore investment and the capacity of the SOE to 
make that investment, focusing specifically on national economic securi-
ty and compliance with industry policies of the Chinese government.
47
 
MOFCOM considers a variety of factors when reviewing an application 
to invest offshore.
48
 In 2012, SASAC announced new guidelines requir-




While Chinese investment in Australia for the 2011–2012 fiscal 
year fell short of investment Australia received from the United States 
and the United Kingdom, FDI from China has increased significantly in 
recent years, as evidenced by its rise in rank from eleventh on FIRB’s 
2006–2007 Annual Report (on the sources of proposed foreign invest-
 
PRAC.; Measures for Overseas Investment Management (promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, 
Mar. 16, 2009, effective May 1, 2009) (China), available at http://www.procedurallaw.cn/english/ 
law/200904/t20090402_202192.html; Interim Measures on Administration of Examination and 
Approval of Overseas Investment Projects (promulgated by the Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, 
effective Oct. 9, 2004) (China), available at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/timftaoeaao 
toip1038/. 
 47. In general, NDRC will consider the following factors when reviewing a foreign investment 
proposal: compliance with the laws and regulations of the state; compliance with the applicable 
industry policies; consideration for sustainable development of the economy and society; considera-
tion for the development of strategic resources required for developing the national economy; possi-
ble benefits for technology improvement and development; and the financing plan and financial 
capability of the Chinese investor. Interim Measures on Administration of Examination and Approv-
al of Overseas Investment Projects, supra note 46, at art. 18. 
 48. Measures for Overseas Investment Management, supra note 46, at art. 9. (“Where the 
overseas investment of an enterprise is within any of the following circumstances, the Ministry of 
Commerce or the provincial commerce department shall disapprove it: (1) endangering the state 
sovereignty, national security, and public interests of China, or violating a law or regulation of Chi-
na; (2) damaging the relationship between China and a relevant country or region; (3) likely violat-
ing any international treaty concluded by China with a foreign party; or (4) involving any technology 
or goods prohibited by China from import.”); see also Interim Measure on Administration of Exami-
nation and Approval of Overseas Investment Protjects, supra note 46, at art. 18. 
 49. Wei Chen & Jiahao Xie, Chinese Update—New SASAC Rules Enacted to Consummate 
Outbound Investment Supervisory System for Central SOEs, XBMA FORUM (July 4, 2012), 
http://xbma.org/forum/chinese-update-new-sasac-rules-enacted-to-consummate-outbound-investm 
ent-supervisory-system-for-central-soes/. Chinese companies face formidable obstacles in develop-
ing the expertise and experience necessary for global business success. David Shambaugh, Are Chi-
na’s Multinational Corporations Really Multinational?, E. ASIA FORUM Q., Apr.–June 2012, at 7. 
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ment in Australia) to third for 2011–2012.
50
 China is now Australia’s 
most important trading partner
51
 and is still significantly underrepresent-
ed in terms of foreign investment in Australia when compared with its 
dominant trade relationship. 
Public perception of Chinese investment in Australia is one of gen-
eral disapproval. In 2013, the Lowy Institute Poll reported that 57% of 
those surveyed said that the Australian government is allowing too much 
investment from China.
52
This principally negative community attitude is 
further illustrated by the general tenor of the submissions received by the 
Australian Senate Economies Inquiry into Foreign Investment by State 
Owned Entities in 2009.
53
 From the Chinese perspective, Chinese inves-
tors perceive a lack of trust and have concerns about discrimination as 
compared with FDI sourced from other countries.
54
 
IV. OVERVIEW OF AUSTRALIA’S FOREIGN INVESTMENT        
REGULATORY REGIME 
Foreign investment in Australia is regulated by the Foreign Acqui-
sitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (the Act)
55
 and by the Australian gov-
                                                     
 
 50. Annual Report 2005–06, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD, 30 (Dec. 11, 2006), 
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/publications/annualreports/2005-2006/_downloads/2005-06_FIRB_ 
AR.pdf (Austl.); Annual Report 2011–12, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. BOARD, 39 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://www.firb.gov.au/content/Publications/AnnualReports/2011-2012/_downloads/FIRB-Annual-
Report-2011-12_v4.pdf (Austl.). 
 51. NEIL BATTY & FRANK BINGHAM, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, AUSTRALIA’S 
EXPORTS TO CHINA 2001–2011, at 3 (2012) (Austl.), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/publication 
s/stats-pubs/australias-exports-to-china-2001-2011.pdf. 
 52. ALEX OLIVER, THE LOWY INSTITUTE POLL 2013: AUSTRALIA AND THE WORLD: PUBLIC 
OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY 6 (2013) (Austl.), available at http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/low 
ypoll2013_web_corrected_p5.pdf. 
 53. On March 18, 2009, the Senate made a referral to the Senate Standing Committee on Eco-
nomics to inquire and report on the international experience of SWFs and SOEs on its role in acqui-
sitions of significant shareholdings in corporations; the impact and outcomes of such acquisitions on 
business growth and competition; and the Australian experience in the context of Australia’s foreign 
investment arrangements. The Committee reported its findings on September 17, 2009. No material 
changes to the Australian regime were recommended in the final report. Senate Economic Refer-
ences Committee, Parliament of Australia, Foreign Investment by State-Owned Entities (2009) 61–
62 (Austl.), available at  http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Econo 
mics/Completed%20inquiries/2008-10/firb_09/report/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/economic 
s_ctte/completed_inquiries/2008_10/firb_09/report/report_pdf.ashx.  
 54. Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 10–11.  
 55. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) (Austl.). Prior to the adoption of the 
Act, foreign investment had largely been regulated through foreign exchange control mechanisms. 
Foreign Investment Policy in Australia—A Brief History and Recent Developments, TREASURY, 64 
(Apr. 16, 2012), http://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/195/PDF/round5.pdf (Austl.) [hereinafter 
A Brief History and Recent Developments]. Interim arrangements had been in place since 1972. 
Companies (Foreign Takeovers) Act 1972 (Cth) (Austl.). 
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ernment’s Foreign Investment Policy (the Policy).
56
 The Federal Treas-
urer is ultimately responsible for all decisions relating to foreign invest-
ment and for administration of the Policy. The Treasurer is advised and 
assisted by the FIRB, which administers the Act in accordance with the 
Policy. FIRB is an administrative body with no statutory existence, and 
while the Act makes no reference to it whatsoever, the Policy confirms 
FIRB’s role.
57
 All decisions by the Treasurer relating to a foreign in-
vestment proposal are supported by analysis and recommendations made 
by FIRB. 
The purpose of this foreign investment approval regime is to em-
power the Treasurer to give orders with respect to proposals that are un-
der consideration that may be “contrary to the national interest” of Aus-
tralia.
58
 There is no definition in either the Act or the Policy for the term 
contrary to the national interest, and each proposal is assessed on a case-
by-case basis.
59
 Under the current Policy, the government determines 
what is contrary to the national interest by having regard for the widely 
held community concerns of Australians.
60
 The Australian government 
does not publish reasons for decisions it makes under the Act or Policy. 
When the Act was first introduced into Parliament in 1975, the 
Treasurer suggested that the “national interest” criterion should be as-
sessed by reference to a determination of (I) whether the proposed in-
vestment would have net economic benefits to Australia to justify the 
change in foreign control; (ii) whether the foreign investor was expected 
to follow practices consistent with Australian expectations; and (iii) 
whether the proposal would be consistent with the government’s policy 
objectives. In assessing these matters, the Treasurer suggested that the 
government would look at factors such as Australian participation in 
ownership, control, and management, as well as the interests of employ-
ees, shareholders, and creditors.
61
 In the mid-1980s, the government 
                                                     
 
 56. Treasury, Austl. Gov't, Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, FOREIGN INVESTMENT REV. 
BOARD  (Mar. 4,  2013), www.firb.gov.au/content/_downloads/AFIP_2013.pdf [hereinafter Austral-
ia’s Foreign Investment Policy]. 
 57. Id. at 1. 
 58. Id. 
 59. In the Second Reading Speech for the Foreign Takeovers Bill 1975 in the House of Repre-
sentatives, the Treasurer stated that the criteria for judging applications had not been incorporated 
into the proposed legislation “because the criteria must be flexible in their interpretation and applica-
tion[,] and it has been found that it would be impracticable, consistent with the need for such flexi-
bility, to express the criteria with the precision required by legislative form.” Commonwealth, Par-
liamentary Debates, House of Representatives, May 22, 1975, 2678 (Frank Stewart) (Austl.). 
 60. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, supra note 56, at 1. 
 61. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, supra note 59, at 2678–79. 
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adopted a more liberal interpretation of the national interest criterion.
62
 
The “net economic benefit” test was abandoned on the basis that foreign 
direct investment was acknowledged to have clear economic benefits for 
Australia. 
Now, in considering whether the national interest test is sufficiently 
met for approval, the Treasurer may impose conditions that he considers 
necessary to protect the national interest of the Australian government.
63
 
The Treasurer is under no obligation to justify or explain his reasons for 
imposing such conditions. In the event that a foreign investor does not 
comply with a condition, such noncompliance would constitute an of-
fense and would thus reactivate the Treasurer’s powers under the Act.
64
 
The Treasurer rarely rejects an investment application by a foreign 
investor. Approximately 10,000 investment applications are received by 
FIRB each year,
65
 and typically, less than 100 of these are rejected.
66
 On-
ly two explicit rejections of a significant corporate transaction have oc-
curred in the last decade: the rejection of Shell’s proposal to acquire 
100% of Woodside Petroleum Limited in 2001
67
 and Singapore Ex-
change’s proposal to acquire 100% of Australian Securities Exchange in 
2011.
68
 In neither case did the involvement of an SWF or a SOE in the 
proposed acquisition precipitate the rejection decision. Nevertheless, ap-
plicants have no right of administrative or judicial review of foreign in-
vestment decisions made under the Act or Policy. The Administrative 
Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 specifically exempts decisions 
made under the Act from administrative review.
69
 
                                                     
 
 62. A Brief History and Recent Developments, supra note 55, at 64. 
 63. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 25(1A) (Austl.). 
 64. Id. at ss 25(1C), (1D). 
 65. Annual Report 2011–12, supra note 50, at 19 (11,420 applications that year). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Foreign Investment Proposal— Shell Australia Investments Limited’s Acquisition of Wood-
side Petroleum Limited, PETER COSTELLO (Apr. 23, 2001), http://www.petercostello.com.au/press/2 
001/2429-foreign-investment-proposal-shell-australia-investments-limiteda-s-shell. The rejection 
was based on a view that Shell might not develop the North West Shelf projects of Woodside in 
Australia as part of Shell’s broader portfolio of assets outside Australia as quickly as it would on a 
stand-alone basis. Id. 
 68. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision’ (Media Release, No. 030, Apr. 8, 2011) 
(Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2011/0 
30.htm&pageID=&min=wms&Year=2011&DocType=0. Swan’s rejection was based on a view that 
it is in the national interest for Australia to maintain the strength and stability of its financial system 
and to build Australia’s standing as a global financial services center in Asia to take advantage of its 
superannuation system and that he had concerns the proposal would be contrary to these objectives. 
Id. 
 69. Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) sch 1 para (h) (Austl.). 
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In recent years, there have been several parliamentary reviews of 
the foreign investment regime, particularly concerning SWF and SOE 
investment
70
—and the associated approval regimes—applicable to rural 
land.
71
 Those parliamentary reviews have not yet resulted in any change 
to the basic structure of the Australian approval regime.
72
  The approval 
regime is extremely convoluted in its regulatory structure, which com-
prises three key areas of regulation: transactions that require prior notifi-
cation and mandatory approval under the Act; transactions that enliven 
the Treasurer’s powers of divestiture under the Act; and transactions that 
require prior approval under the Policy. 
A. Compulsory Approval Under the Act 
Under the Act, foreign persons must seek prior approval to acquire 
(alone or together with their associates) control of 15% or more of voting 
rights (or potential voting rights), or to acquire interests in 15% or more 
of the issued shares (or rights to be issued shares) in an Australian corpo-
ration with gross assets of AU$248 million or more.
73
 It is an offense to 
enter into such an acquisition without giving prior notification and ob-
taining a statement of approval by the government. 
                                                     
 
 70. Senate Economic References Committee, supra note 53. No significant changes were pro-
posed by this review. Id. at 61–62. 
 71. Senate Economic Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, Foreign Acquisitions 
Amendment (Agricultural Land) Bill 2010 (2011), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary 
_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=economics_ctte/completed_inquiries/2010-13/forei 
gn_acquisition_farmland_2011/index.htm; Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Refer-
ences Committee, Parliament of Australia, Foreign Investment and The National Interest (2013), 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/wopapub/senate/committee/rrat_ctte/completed_inquiri 
es/2010-13/firb_2011/report/report.ashx. 
 72. The June 2013 Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee majority 
report proposes a much lower review threshold for agricultural land-cumulative purchases of AU$15 
million or more for agricultural land and 15% or more of agribusinesses valued at AU$248 million 
or more (indexed), or an investment of AU$54 million or more in an agribusiness, as well as a re-
quirement to consider the interests of local communities in screening those proposals. Senate Rural 
and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee, supra note 71, at 75. 
 73. The Act sets out the requirement to give prior notification. Foreign Acquisitions and Take-
overs Act 1975(Cth) s 26 (Austl.). However, there is an exemption where the corporation has gross 
assets of less than AU$248 million (calendar year 2013). Id. s 13A(4)(b)(ii); Foreign Acquisitions 
and Takeovers Regulations 1989 (Cth) reg 5(2) (Austl.). For investors in the United States and New 
Zealand, an AU$1,098 million threshold applies (calendar year 2013), except for certain prescribed 
sectors or where an entity is controlled by a United States or New Zealand governmental entity. 
Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 17E (Austl.); Foreign Acquisitions and Takeo-
vers Regulations 1989 (Cth) reg 9 (Austl.). Separately, the Act provides for a notification regime that 
is compulsory with respect to acquisitions of interests in Australian urban land for which there is 
generally no monetary threshold. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) § 26A (Austl.). 
However, this Article is focused on the regulation of investment in corporations. 
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For purposes of the Act, a foreign person is (I) any non-resident of 
Australia; (ii) a corporation in which a nonresident holds voting rights or 
issued shares of 15% or more; (iii) a corporation in which non-residents 
in the aggregate hold voting rights or issued shares of 40% or more; or 
(iv) trustees of trusts with foreign ownership beyond these thresholds.
74
 
The interests of foreign persons and their associates are aggregated in a 
given analysis. The meaning of “associate” is notoriously difficult to ap-
ply.
75
 For purposes of these provisions, the prohibition applies only to an 




For purposes of calculating a 15% interest in an Australian corpora-
tion, the potential right to acquire voting power or the right to be issued 
shares is included.
77
 These provisions are expressed to capture all ar-
rangements that involve a future right to acquire voting shares or issued 
shares, regardless of the way in which they are structured, including debt 
instruments having quasi-equity characteristics and convertible promis-
sory notes.
78
 Structures that do not give rise to potential voting power or 
rights to issued shares (e.g., cash-settled derivative structures) do not ap-
pear to fall within the compulsory notification regime but may neverthe-
less activate the Treasurer’s powers if the acquisition gives the person 
the ability to determine the corporate policy in relation to any matter.
79
 
This is considered further below. 
                                                     
 
 74. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 26(1) (Austl.). For other definitions 
in the Act, see id. at s 5. Where ownership is dispersed, obvious practical difficulties arise in seeking 
to identify “foreign persons” if the 40% in the aggregate trigger is enlivened. 
 75. Id. at s 6. Unlike other provisions of Australian law seeking to track share ownership 
thresholds, the “associate” reference is not primarily linked to action in concert. Compare id., with 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 1.2, div 2 (Austl.). For example, an associate is a company in which 
a person and their associate have a 15% or more investment. Significant potential confusion is 
caused by a provision that any person who is an associate of a person by one application of the defi-
nition is also an associate of the person by another application of the definition, see Foreign Acquisi-
tions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 6(l) (Austl.), causing a potential infinite regression of applica-
tions. The question arises in the foreign investment context in determining whether Chinese SOEs, 
by virtue of their common government ownership, should be aggregated or assumed to be related or 
associated. The Executive Member of FIRB has given evidence to the Senate Economics Committee 
that for the purposes of the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeover Act 1975, Chinese SOEs are not 
considered to be associated. Senate Economic References Committee, supra note 44, at E6. 
 76. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) ss 5, 13(I)(a)–(c) (Austl.). 
 77. Id. at s 9(1). 
 78. Id. at s 11(2A). 
 79. Id. at s 21(5). 
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B. Treasurer’s Additional Powers Under the Act 
The Act also gives the Treasurer power, in certain circumstances, to 
give an order prohibiting a proposed transaction and, in cases in which a 
transaction has already been completed, to direct a foreign person to dis-
pose of shares or terminate arrangements.
80
 The Treasurer’s powers ap-
ply to a broader range of acquisitions than that which is captured by the 
pre-approval requirement. However, the powers will only be activated 
when the Treasurer determines the result of the acquisition to be contrary 
to Australia’s national interest.
81
 
The Treasurer’s powers are enlivened if a prescribed corporation 
(defined infra) becomes controlled by foreign persons or if there is a 
change in foreign control. Control by a foreign person is control of 15% 
of the voting power or potential voting power; control of 15% of the is-
sued shares (or rights to be issued shares) by an individual foreign per-
son; control of 40% of the voting power or potential voting power; or 
control 40% of the issued shares (or rights to be issued shares) by foreign 
persons in aggregate.
82
 A change in foreign control occurs when a corpo-
ration is, in the aggregate, under at least 40% foreign control and when 
there is a change to the organization of those foreign holders, unless the 
Treasurer is satisfied that, upon review of all the surrounding circum-




The Act does permit that where a proposed transaction enlivens the 
Treasurer’s powers, a foreign person can make an application such that if 
no objection is raised, the Treasurer’s powers will be deactivated.
84
 The 
practical implication of these provisions is that for significant transac-
tions requiring commercial certainty, the Treasurer’s approval is inevita-
bly sought. 
The Treasurer’s powers extend to investments in prescribed corpo-
rations that carry on an Australian business
85
 and holding companies of 
such prescribed corporations.
86
 A “prescribed corporation” includes off-
                                                     
 
 80. Id. at ss 18(2), 18(4), 19(2), 19(4), 20(2), 20(3), 21(2)–(3). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at ss 9(1), 9(1A). 
 83. Id. at ss 9(1A), 9(2). 
 84. Id. at s 25(2)–(3). 
 85. The Act provides that “a reference in th[e] Act to an Australian business is to a business 
carried on wholly or partly in Australia in anticipation of profit or gain” either alone or together with 
another person. Id. at s 7(1). 
 86. Id. at s 18(1). The concept of a prescribed corporation is much broader in scope than an 
“Australian corporation,” which is relevant to the prior approval test. Id. at s 26. 
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shore companies with specified categories of Australian assets in which 
the company’s gross Australian assets are valued at AU$248 million or 




The Treasurer’s powers also extend to the acquisition of assets, ra-
ther than an interest in shares, of a company. The Treasurer may prohibit 
proposed acquisitions of assets valued at AU$248 million or more of an 
Australian business carried on by a prescribed corporation that would 
lead to the business coming under foreign control (or being controlled by 
new foreign persons) if the result would be contrary to the national inter-
est.
88
 An Australian business is “a business carried on partly or wholly in 
Australia in anticipation of profit or gain.”
89
 For these purposes, control 




In addition to outright acquisitions, the Treasurer’s powers extend 
to two situations in which the Australian government enters into such 
arrangements with foreign persons that may influence the conduct of an 
Australian business.
91




 An agreement is to be entered into concerning the affairs of a 
corporation or is to alter an organizational document of a corpo-
ration. 
 As a result, a director or directors of a corporation will be under 
an obligation to act in accordance with the directions, instruc-
tions, or desires of a foreign person or an associate with control 
as defined above. 
 As a result, the corporation would be controlled by foreign per-
sons or new foreign persons. 
 The result would be contrary to the national interest. 
 
                                                     
 
 87. The Act provides that a foreign corporation whose Australian assets make up not less than 
one half of its gross assets is a prescribed corporation. Id.at s 13(1)(g). There is an exemption for 
companies where the total assets does not exceed AU$248 million (calendar year 2013). Id. at 
s 13A(4)(b)(ii); Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Regulations 1989 (Cth) reg 5(2) (Austl.). 
 88. Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975 (Cth) s 19(2) (Austl.). 
 89. Id. at s 7(1). The holding of a mineral right is such a business. Id. at s 7(2). 
 90. Id. at s 19(7). 
 91. The Act also applies to acquisition of interests in Australian urban land. Id. at s 21A. How-
ever, this Article is focused on the regulation of investment in corporations. 
 92. Id. at s 20(2). 
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The second situation arises when the following occurs:
93
 
 An arrangement is to be entered into or terminated in relation to 
an Australian business carried on solely by prescribed corpora-
tions. For these purposes, an arrangement means leasing, hir-
ing, or the granting of rights to use or, more importantly, partic-
ipate in profits or management. 
 As a result, the business would be controlled by foreign persons 
or new foreign persons. 
 The result would be contrary to the national interest. 
 
The first situation is narrower than the second because it is prem-
ised on a foreign person being in control of a corporation, resulting in 
directors of that corporation being under an obligation to that foreign 
person. However, in both situations, the result must be that the corpora-
tion or business will be “controlled” by foreign persons. The Act expands 
the concept of control to include circumstances in which a person and her 
associates are able to determine the policy of the corporation “in relation 
to any matter.”
94
 This provision is potentially broad enough to capture 
interests, including the following: structures using convertible instru-
ments; economic only interests; or derivative or swap positions in Aus-
tralian or offshore entities with Australian assets, if that interest gives a 
foreign person or persons the ability to determine the policy of a corpora-
tion in relation to any matter. 
C. Applications Under the Act 
If a foreign person is required to obtain prior approval under the 
Act or if they wish to make an application under the Act so that the 
Treasurer’s powers are deactivated, then the applicant must provide 
FIRB with specified information about the company, the target, and the 
transaction. Once notification of the proposed transaction has been 
lodged, the Treasurer has thirty days to make a decision and ten days to 
notify the applicant of that decision.
95
 If the applicant has not proceeded 
with the transaction and the Treasurer does not give any notification 
within that time, the Treasurer ceases to have power with respect to that 
proposal.
96
 However, the Treasurer may provide an interim order if more 
                                                     
 
 93. Id. at s 21(2). 
 94. Id. at ss 20(5)(a), 21(5)(a) (emphasis added). These provisions were inserted in the Act in 
2010. 
 95. Id. at ss 24, 25(1B), 25(2). 
 96. Id. at s 25(2). 
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time is required to allow due consideration of the application.
97
 An inter-
im order prohibits the applicant from proceeding with the proposal for a 
period of up to ninety days, after which the Treasurer has a period of ten 
days in which to notify the applicant of the decision.
98
 
D. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy 
The Policy imposes additional restrictions on investments by for-
eign persons in a limited number of sensitive sectors (such as banking, 
civil aviation, telecommunication, airports, airlines, shipping, and media) 
as well as investments by foreign governments and their agencies. The 
Policy has no legislative force, but adherence to its requirements is 
achieved in practice by a number of means, such as the possibility of re-
fusal to grant necessary ministerial (or other) approvals under other Aus-
tralian law and the prospect of ongoing resistance from the Australian 
government to the relevant investor’s activities, including the likelihood 
that future applications under the Act might be refused. 
Thus, the Policy imposes additional obligations upon SWFs and 
SOEs. These obligations are in addition to those imposed by the Act. 
Applications under the Policy are not governed by the statutory processes 
set forth in the Act, and therefore, the government is not required to re-
spond to applications arising under the Policy within pre-defined time 
constraints. Under this regime, applications by Chinese SOEs in 2008–
2009 were under review for prolonged periods, which in some circum-
stances proved commercially significant.
99
 
Any “direct investment” by “foreign government investors,” irre-
spective of size, requires notification for prior approval. These applica-
tions are addressed on a case-by-case basis.
100
 On February 17, 2008, the 
Australian Treasurer released a set of additional Guidelines for Foreign 
Government Investment Proposals,
101
 which purported to “enhance the 
transparency of Australia’s foreign investment screening regime” in the 
areas of SWFs and SOEs. The Treasurer suggested that these new Guide-
lines did not reflect a new development.
102
 However, many commenta-
                                                     
 
 97. Id. at s 22(1). 
 98. Id. at ss 22(2), 24. 
 99. See infra Part V. 
 100. See Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, supra note 56, at 2, 14–15. 
 101. Wayne Swan, ‘Government Improves Transparency of Foreign Investment Screening 
Process’ (Media Release, No. 009, Feb. 17 2008) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.a 
u/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/009.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType. 
 102. In a speech to the Australia–China Business Council in Melbourne on July 4, 2008, the 
Treasurer made the following comments in relation to the Guidelines: “These guidelines were those 
used by the previous government; they are what we use too. They are not new. . . .” Wayne Swan, 
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tors argued that the release of these Guidelines indicated an overall shift 




In understanding the potential scope of the pre-approval require-
ment for investments by SWFs and SOEs, it is necessary to consider 
which investors would be considered a foreign government investor and 
what is meant by direct investment. These terms are defined very broadly 
and ambiguously in the Policy and reflect the Australian government’s 
experience in seeking to regulate these types of transactions in recent 
years. 
For the purposes of the Policy, a foreign government investor is 
considered by FIRB to be an entity in which a foreign government or its 
agencies have an interest of 15% or more; foreign governments or their 
agencies have an aggregate interest of 40% or more; or it is otherwise 
controlled by foreign governments or their agencies, or could be con-
trolled by them as part of a controlling group.
104
 Experience suggests that 
in the current political environment, the Australian government would 
take a broad view of what constitutes a foreign government agency and 
would instead look at practical decision-making processes and other in-
dicia of control rather than just focus on the ownership structure of a par-
ticular entity.
105
 For example, the global financial crisis saw a succession 
of government-sponsored financial bailouts of some of the largest corpo-
rate enterprises in the world. All global companies and financial institu-
tions that have had a more than 15% capital injection from a government 
or SWF are treated as an SOE under Australia’s regulatory framework. 
A direct investment is considered by FIRB to be an investment that 
provides the investor with potential influence or control over the target. 
 
Treasurer, Austl., China and This Asian Century, Speech Delivered at the Australia–China Business 
Council (July 4, 2008), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeche 
s/2008/021.htm&pageID=005&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=1. 
 103. The Treasurer said at the time, 
You will have heard, as I have, a couple of arguments about our approach to Chinese in-
vestment—broadly, that we have changed our policy to a more restrictive stance, and fur-
thermore, are slowing down the processing of Chinese applications. I don’t think either of 
these stand up when considered against the facts. I have approved a Chinese investment 
proposal on average once every nine days since coming into office. This is certainly not a 
slowing pace. 
Id. However, it would seem that the Guidelines were issued shortly after the initial Chinalco invest-
ment in Rio Tinto, described infra Part V.B, with further Chinese SOE investments announced 
around that time. See Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 10. 
 104. Australia’s Foreign Investment Policy, supra note 56, at 17. 
 105. The Policy states that foreign government investors should notify the government for 
review if they have any doubt as to whether an investment is notifiable. Id. at 2. 
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Any investment of an interest of 10% or more in an entity is considered a 
direct investment. An interest of less than 10% may be considered a di-
rect investment if the investor is building a strategic state or can use the 
investment to influence or control the target. If the investment includes 
special or veto rights, director appointment rights, is related to contractu-
al arrangements (such as loan, service, or off take arrangements), or if it 
involves the building or maintaining of a strategic or long-term relation-




The Guidelines promulgated in 2008 have now been absorbed into 
the Policy.
107
 The primary area of focus for the Australian government 
will be to assess whether the investment is commercial in nature or 
whether the investor may be pursuing broader political or strategic objec-
tives. This includes assessing whether the governance arrangements 
could facilitate actual or potential government control, including through 
funding arrangements. Where there are minority investors in the foreign 
government investor, the size, nature, and composition of that minority 
will be considered. 
Mitigating factors that the Australian government will consider are 
external partners or shareholders in the investment, the level of non-
associated investment, the governance arrangement, ongoing arrange-
ments to protect Australian interests from non-commercial dealings, and 
whether the target will remain listed on the Australian Securities Ex-
change (ASX) or another exchange. The Australian government will also 
consider the size, importance, and potential impact of the investment. 
E. Industry-Based Restrictions 
In addition to the review process imposed under the Act and the 
Policy, Australian legislation restricts foreign ownership in a limited 
range of sensitive industries, including shipping, aviation, airports, bank-
ing, and gaming.
108
 There are also specific restrictions relating to foreign 
ownership of Qantas and Telstra.
109
 Any investment by foreign persons 
                                                     
 
 106. Holding an interest of less than 10% following enforcement of a security interest is also 
considered a direct investment. Id. at 14. 
 107. Id. at 2 (section titled “Foreign Government Investors”). 
 108. For examples of these types of legislation, see Shipping Registration Act 1981 (Cth) s 12 
(Austl.); Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth) s 11A(2) (Austl.); Airports Act 1996 (Cth) s 40 (Austl.); 
Banking Act 1959 (Cth) s 9(2) (Austl.); Financial Sector (Shareholdings) Act 1998 (Cth) s 10 
(Austl.); and the Casino Control Acts and the analogous legislation of each Australian state. 
 109. Qantas Sale Act 1992 (Cth) s 7(1)(a) (Austl.); Telstra Corporation Act 1991 (Cth) s 8BD 
(Austl.). 
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in these circumstances requires specific consideration under the relevant 
legislation. 
V. CHINESE SOE INVESTMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
In the period following 2008, there were a number of significant 
FDI proposals by Chinese SOEs in Australia, particularly in the re-
sources sector. The case studies in that period, described below, illustrate 
the journey the Australian government has embarked upon in grappling 
with the issues associated with SOE and SWF investment in Australia. 
The Australian experience during this time was tumultuous. The in-
itial wave of resources investment by Chinese SOEs in early 2008 left 
the new Labor government ill-prepared for the policy issues arising from 
SOE investment.
110
 While not considerable in total numbers, a perceived 
onslaught of resource-related Chinese proposals in early 2009 resulted in 
a logjam of applications. Delays arose in processing those applications. 
While no application was formally rejected, significant pressures none-
theless arose on all sides in the processing of the applications.
111
 Since 
then, there has been greater predictability of the likely terms for approval 
of SOE investment. However, the conditions of approval for the higher 
profile proposals remain harsh.
112
 
                                                     
 
 110. David Uren, Chinalco’s Rio Raid Rattled the Government, AUSTRALIAN (June 4, 2012), 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/business/chinalcos-rio-raid-rattled-the-government/story-
fn8sc6jr-1226381969530#. 
 111. The Oz Minerals initial proposal would have been rejected, leading to a revised proposal 
that was accepted. China’s Minmetals Revises Bid for Oz Minerals, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Mar. 
31, 2009, 6:53 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/chinas-minmetals-revises-bid-for-oz-
minerals/?_r=0. The second Chinalco proposal was commercially terminated in a circumstance 
where the government’s final position was unknown (this was the largest ever FDI proposal made by 
a Chinese SOE, where the political stakes of a government rejection would likely have been very 
high). David Barboza & Michael Wines, Mining Giant Scraps China Deal, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/business/global/05mine.html. The Lynas proposal was 
commercially terminated when the government’s proposed conditions were not considered commer-
cially acceptable by the Chinese investor. Matthew Murphy. China Quits Rare Deal with Lynas, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 25, 2009), http://www.smh.com.au/business/china-quits-rare-
deal-with-lynas-20090924-g4re.html. 
 112. E.g., Nick Sherry, ‘Foreign Investment Proposal: Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Lim-
ited Acquisition of Felix Resources Limited’ (Media Release, No. 081, Aug. 31, 2012) (Austl.) 
[hereinafter Yanzhou Conditions], available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?do 
c=pressreleases/2009/081.htm&pageID=003&min=njsa&Year=2009&DocType=0; Wayne Swan, 
‘Foreign Investment Decision: Shandong RuYi Scientific & Technological Group Co. Ltd. and 
Lempriere Pty. Ltd. Acquisition of the Assets of Cubbie Group Limited’ (Media Release, No. 079, 
Aug. 31, 2012) (Austl.) [hereinafter Cubbie Conditions], available at http://ministers.treasury. 
gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2012/079.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&Doc
Type=0. 
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A. Key Areas of Focus When Assessing Investments by SWFs and SOEs 
Several key considerations for Australian governmental approval of 
FDI by SWFs and SOEs (and, in particular, investments by Chinese 
SOEs) can be summarized from the case studies reviewed below. Those 
considerations are as follows: 
 Consideration of the resource in question (or other industry in 
which the investment is proposed) to ascertain the dynamics of 
how price and supply are determined so as to ensure that pric-
ing and supply will continue to be market-based;
113
 
 Sensitivity to national security issues (real or perceived);114 




 Assets to be developed according to market-based principles;116 




 Commitment to sell down over medium term in appropriate 
cases to allow market-based ownership.
118
 




                                                     
 
 113. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Minmetals Resources Limited Acquisi-
tion of Album Resources Private Limited’ (Media Release, No. 093, Dec. 19, 2010) (Austl.) [herein-
after Minmetals Conditions],  available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc= 
pressreleases/2010/093.htm&page ID=003&min=wms&Year=2010&DocType=0; Yanzhou Condi-
tions supra note 112; Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112. 
 114. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment: China Minmetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co. Ltd—
Proposed Acquisition of OZ Minerals Ltd.’ (Media Release, No. 029, Mar. 27, 2009) (Austl.) [here-
inafter Original Minmetals Decision], available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.asp 
x?doc=pressreleases/2009/029.htm&page ID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=0. 
 115. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Approval: Sinosteel’s Interest in Murchison 
Metals Ltd. (Media Release, No. 100, Sept. 21, 2008) (Austl.) [hereinafter Sinosteel Decision], 
available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/100.htm& 
pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=0. 
 116. E.g., Minmetals Conditions, supra note 113; Peter Costello, ‘Foreign Investment Pro-
posal—Shell Australia Investments Limited’s Acquisition of Woodside Petroleum Limited (Media 
Release, No. 025, Apr. 23, 2001) (Austl.) [hereinafter Shell Rejection], available at http://ministers. 
treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs. 
aspx?doc=pressreleases/2001/025.htm&pageID=003&min=phc&Year=2001&DocType=0. 
 117. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Chinalco’s Acquisition of Share in Rio Tinto’ (Media Release, No. 
094, Aug. 24, 2008) (Austl.) [hereinafter Chinalco Decision], available at http://ministers.treasury. 
gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2008/094.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2008&
DocType=0; Sinosteel Decision, supra note 115; Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112; Murphy, supra 
note 111. 
 118. E.g., Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112; Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112. 
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 Possible need to create information barriers to prevent         
nominee–director access to pricing information.
121
 
B. Experience in Recent Years 
Date Transaction 
2008 Target: February 1, 2008: Acquisition by Chinalco
122
 of a 9% shareholding in Rio 
Tinto Group
123
 for $12 billion by open market purchase. 
Application Status: August 24, 2008: Acquisition approved.
124
  
Undertakings were given that prohibited the company from increase share-
holding without further approval and from seeking to appoint director while share-
holding is below 15%. 
2008 Target: Possible reverse takeover of Murchison Metals Ltd. (iron ore exploration 
company) by Sinosteel
125
 seeking to acquire 100% of Midwest Corp. by takeover 
offer announced March 14, 2008, and Murchison Metals Ltd. (iron ore exploration 
 
 119. E.g., Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Hunan Valin Iron and Steel Group—
Acquisition of up to a 17.55 Percent Interest in Fortescue Metals Group (Media Release, No. 032, 
Mar. 31, 2009) (Austl.) [hereinafter Hunan Valin Conditions], available at http://ministers.treasury. 
gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/032.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&Doc
Type=0; Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112. 
 120. E.g., Minmetals Conditions, supra note 113;Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112; Cubbie 
Conditions, supra note 112. 
 121. E.g., Hunan Valin Conditions, supra note 119. 
 122. Chinalco is a Chinese SOE 100% owned by the Chinese people. Overview, CHINALCO, 
http://www.chalco.com.cn/zl/web/chinalco_en_show.jsp?ColumnID=122 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) 
(China). 
 123. Rio Tinto PLC is a company incorporated in England and listed on the London Stock 
Exchange as the English arm of the dual-listed Rio Tinto Group. Group Overview, RIO TINTO, 
http://www.riotinto.com/aboutus/group-overview-5231.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (U.K.). The 
Australian arm of the Rio Tinto Group is Rio Tinto Ltd., a company incorporated in Australia with 
its primary listing on the ASX. Id. By virtue of the dual listing arrangements, the two Rio Tinto 
listed entities are intended to operate and be managed as a single economic unit. Id. Chinalco’s 12% 
shareholding in Rio Tinto PLC equated to an approximate 9% economic interest in the Rio Tinto 
Group, and it was reported Chinalco received had legal advice that it did not require prior approval 
for an investment in Rio Tinto PLC up to 14.9% because it was acquiring shares in a company in-
corporated in England and listed on the London Stock Exchange. Uren, supra note 110. 
 124. Wayne Swan, ‘Chinalco’s Acquisition of Shares in Rio Tinto’ (Media Release, No. 094, 
Aug. 24, 2008) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=press 
releases/2008/094.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=2008&DocType=0. 
 125. Sinosteel is a Chinese SOE that is 100% owned by the Chinese people. See About Sino-
steel, SINOSTEEL, http://en.sinosteel.com/zggk/jtjj/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China). 
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Date Transaction 
company) seeking to acquire 100% of Midwest Corp. by scrip scheme of arrange-
ment announced May, 26, 2008.
126
 Sinosteel acquired 100% of Midwest. Both 
Murchison Metals and Midwest were seeking to develop the Midwest iron ore re-
gion of Western Australia together with the infrastructure required for that devel-
opment. The Murchison transaction did not proceed. 
Application Status: Midwest acquisition approval given.
127
 
 Interim orders made on Murchison transaction.
128
 Approval to acquire up to 
49.9% of the shares in Murchison with no approval given for a higher shareholding 
in the interests of “diversity of ownership” of iron ore in the Midwest region.
129
 
2009 Target: On February 12, 2009, Rio Tinto Group announced that it had entered into a 
Co-operation and Implementation Agreement with Chinalco for a further proposed 
US$19.5 billion strategic partnership. The proposed transaction involved the in-
vestment by Chinalco of US$7.2 billion through convertible bonds as well as a 
US$12.3 billion investment in certain Rio Tinto assets.  
On June 24, 2009, Rio Tinto Group announced that it had terminated the Co-
operation and Implementation Agreement with Chinalco and instead would pursue 
an AU$15 billion rights issue at £14 per share and joint venture with BHP in rela-
tion to its iron ore assets in the Pilbara region. 
Application Status: Interim order.
130
 No decision reached. 
                                                     
 
 126. If Murchison acquired Midwest when Sinosteel controlled Midwest, Sinosteel would then 
control Murchison. 
 127. Sinosteel obtained unconditional FIRB approval to make the takeover bid at the time it 
sought clearance for its initial investment in January 2008. Tim Lee Master, Sinosteel Taps Mid-
west’s Minority Investors in Pursuit of 20pc Stake, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 25, 2008), 
http://www.scmp.com/article/624211/sinosteel-taps-midwests-minority-investors-pursuit-20pc-
stake. 
 128. On June 25, 2008, an interim order dated June 16, 2008, was published in the Common-
wealth Gazette prohibiting Sinosteel from acquiring a substantial shareholding in or assets of Mur-
chison Metals Ltd. Commonwealth, Gazette, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975: Order 
Under Subsection 22(1), No. 25, June 25, 2008, 1858 (Austl.), available at http://www.com 
law.gov.au/file/2008GN25. 
 129. Sinosteel Decision, supra note 115. The media release noted that Sinosteel’s application 
to acquire up to 100% of Murchison had been withdrawn and that a revised application for up to 
49.9% of Murchison was approved: 
In approving Sinosteel’s application, I have determined that a shareholding of up to 49.9 
percent in Murchison will maintain diversity of ownership within the Mid West region. 
The Government considers the development of such potentially significant new resource 
areas should occur through arrangements that are open to multiple investors. This ap-
proach is consistent with the national interest principles we released in February and with 
the approach I have outlined previously, including in discussions with my Chinese coun-
terparts. 
Id. 
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Date Transaction 
2009 Target: Proposal by China Minmetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co.
131
 on February 16, 
2009, to acquire 100% shareholding in OZ Minerals Ltd. (diversified mining com-
pany) by cash scheme. OZ Minerals had been struggling financially following the 
collapse of commodity markets in 2008 and had been unable to complete the sale of 
various assets, which it had hoped would allow it meet a AU$1.3 billion debt re-
payment due on March 31, 2009. 
Application Status: Revised proposal to acquire most of the assets of OZ Minerals 
on April 1, 2009 by asset sale for AU$1.2 billion. 
Interim order issued.
132
 Initial proposal would not have been approved if it in-
cluded the Prominent Hill site on national security grounds.
133
 
Revised proposal approved April 29, 2009, with undertakings that required the 
acquiring company to do the following:
134
 
- operate the assets as a separate business unit according to commercial ob-
jectives, including the maximization of product prices and long-term profit-
ability and value; 
- own the Australian assets through companies incorporated, headquartered, 
 
 130. On March 23, 2009, FIRB issued an Interim Order extending the period of consideration 
of the proposal by up to 90 days. Commonwealth, Gazette: Special, No. S 48, March 24, 2009, 1 
[hereinafter Gazette: Special], available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/file/2009GN12. 
 131. Minmetals is a Chinese SOE controlled by China Minmetals Corporation as a 90% share-
holder (which is wholly owned by the Chinese government). About Us, CHINA MINMETALS NON-
FERROUS METALS CO., http://cmnltd.minmetals.com.cn/article.do?method=gettop&version= eng-
lish&column_no=2103 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013); Central SOEs, SASAC, http://www.sasac. 
gov.cn/n2963340/n2971121/n4956567/4956583.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China). 
 132. On March 23, 2009, FIRB issued an interim order extending the period for evaluation of 
Minmetal’s application by 90 days. Gazette: Special, supra note 130. 
 133. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment’ (Media Release, No. 029, Mar. 27, 2009) (Austl.), 
available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2009/029.htm& 
pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=0. 
Under the Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act 1975, all foreign investment applica-
tions are examined against Australia’s national interest. An important part of this assess-
ment is whether proposals conform with Australia’s national security interests, in line 
with the principles that apply to foreign government related investments. OZ Minerals’ 
Prominent Hill mining operations are situated in the Woomera Prohibited Area in South 
Australia. The Woomera Prohibited Area weapons testing range makes a unique and sen-
sitive contribution to Australia’s national defence [sic]. It is not unusual for governments 
to restrict access to sensitive areas on national security grounds. The [g]overnment has 
determined that Minmetals’ proposal for OZ Minerals cannot be approved if it includes 
Prominent Hill. . . . Discussions between the Foreign Investment Review Board and 
Minmetals are continuing in relation to OZ Minerals’ other businesses and assets . . . 
Id. 
 134. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Approval for Revised Application by China 
Minmetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co. Ltd. of OZ Minerals Ltd.’ (Media Release, No. 043, Apr. 23, 
2009) (Austl.), available at http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/ 
2009/043.htm&pageID=003&min=wms&Year=&DocType=0. 
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Date Transaction 
and managed in Australia under a predominantly Australian management 
team; 
-  comply with financial reporting requirements under the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth); 
- sell products produced on arms-length terms by a sales team headquartered 
in Australia, with pricing being determined by reference to international 
observable benchmarks and in line with market practice; 
- continue to operate certain assets at current or increased production and 
employment levels 
- pursue the growth of certain projects and comply with Australian industrial 
relations laws 
- honor employee entitlements and support indigenous Australian communi-
ties 
2009 Target: Acquisition by Hunan Valin Iron and Steel Group Co.
135
 of a 17.4% share-
holding in Fortescue Metals Mining Group Ltd. (iron ore mining company). Joint 
venture to develop certain iron ore tenements and off-take arrangement valued at 
AU$650 million announced February 25, 2009. 
Application Status: Interim order issued.
136
Approval given March 31, 2009, on the 
basis of undertakings that include the following:
137
 
- any person nominated by Hunan Valin to Fortescue’s Board will comply 
with the Director’s Code of Conduct maintained by Fortescue; 
- any person nominated by Hunan Valin to Fortescue’s Board will submit a 
standing notice under the Corporations Act of their potential conflict of in-
terest relating to Fortescue’s marketing, sales, customer profiles, price set-
ting, and cost structures for pricing and shipping; 
- Hunan Valin and any person nominated by it to Fortescue’s Board will 
comply with the information segregation arrangements agreed between 
Fortescue and Hunan Valin; 
- Hunan Valin must report to FIRB on its compliance with the undertakings 
with penalties payable for non-compliance. 
                                                     
 
 135. Hunan Valin is a Chinese SOE 100% owned by the Hunan provincial government. Hunan 
Valin Iron and Steel Group Co., Ltd., HUNANGOV, http://www.enghunan.gov.cn/Business/Enterpr 
isesShowList/201005/t20100513_299307.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China). 
 136. FIRB issued an interim order on March 18, 2009, extending the FIRB review period of the 
proposed transaction for up to 30 days. Commonwealth, Gazette, Foreign Acquisitions and Takeo-
vers Act 1975 Order Under Subsection 22(1), No. 11, March 25, 2009, 794 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/file/2009GN11. 
 137. Hunan Valin Conditions, supra note 119. 
560 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:533 
Date Transaction 
2009 Target: Proposed investment by China Non-Ferrous Metal Mining Group (CNMC) 
in Lynas Corp. through heads of agreement dated May 1, 2009, for CNMC to be-
come a 51.6% shareholder in Lynas at AU$0.36 per share and facilitate the arrang-
ing of bank debt in a transaction valued at over AU$500 million. The investment 
would have permitted Lynas to complete and commission a rare earths project. 
On September 24, 2009, Lynas announced that CNMC had terminated the heads of 
agreement. 
Application Status: Interim orders issued.
138
 No FIRB approval at the time the 
transaction was terminated. 
2009 Target: Acquisition by Yanzhou Coal Mining Co.
139
 of 100% of Felix Resources 
Limited (coal mining company) for a cash amount and shares in a subsidiary of Fe-
lix valued at approximately AU$3 billion announced August 13, 2009. 
Application Status: Application was re-lodged.
140
 




- Felix and Yanzhou’s other Australian assets to be owned by an Australian 
holding company headquartered and managed in Australia by a predomi-
nately Australian management and sales team with the following: 
- the Australian holding company and its operating subsidiaries having at 
least two Australian resident directors, one to be independent of Yanzhou; 
- all future Australian operations to be owned by the Australian holding 
company; 
                                                     
 
 138. On July 8, 2009, Lynas announced that FIRB had asked CNMC to resubmit its applica-
tion. CNMC Transaction Update, LYNAS CORP. (July 8, 2009), http://www.lynascorp.com/Announc 
ements/2009/CNMC_Transaction_Update_8_July_2009_739157.pdf (Austl.). On August 3, 2009, 
Lynas announced that FIRB had yet not made a decision and that the thirty-day period for FIRB 
review would now expire in early September 2009. CNMC Transaction Update, LYNAS CORP., 
(Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.lynascorp.com/Announcements/2009/CNMC_Transaction_Update_3_ 
August_2009_V2_747294.pdf (Austl.). On September 2, 2009, Lynas announced that FIRB had not 
yet made a decision and that the thirty-day period for FIRB review would now expire in early Octo-
ber 2009. CNMC Transaction Update, LYNAS CORP., (Sept. 2, 2009), http://www.lynascorp.com/ 
Announcements/2009/CNMC_Transaction_Update_2_September_2009_758500.pdf (Austl.). It 
follows that CNMC withdrew and re-submitted its application three times. By then, five months had 
passed. 
 139. Yanzhou is a Chinese company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, New York 
Stock Exchange, and Shanghai Stock Exchange. Yankuang Group Corporation holds approximately 
53% of Yanzhou which is ultimately controlled by the Shandong Provincial Government. Company 
Overview, YANZHOU COAL MINING CO., http://www.yanzhoucoal.com.cn/en/text/2009-11/10/con 
tent_88347.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China); About Us, YANKUANG GROUP, http://www.yan 
kuanggroup.com.cn/node_6387.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (China). 
 140. FIRB consideration of the proposal required the application to be re-lodged once to re-
activate the thirty-day review period. 
 141. Yanzhou Conditions, supra note 112. 
2014] Foreign Direct Investment by State Controlled Entities 561 
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- the chief executive officer and chief financial officer to have a principal 
place of residence in Australia; and 
- the majority of board meetings to take place Australia. 
The Australian holding company must be operated in accordance with com-
mercial objectives, including maximization of product prices, long-term profitabil-
ity and value with production sold at an arms-length, and a non-discriminatory ba-
sis to all customers at prices determined by reference to international benchmarks in 
line with market practice. The requirements for the Australian holding company 
included the following: 
- Seek to list on ASX by no later than the end of 2010; 
- Yanzhou’s economic ownership of the Australian holding company to be 
less than 70% and of Felix’s existing assets to be less than 50% (there are 
joint venture arrangements in relation to those assets). 
- The chief executive officer of the Australian holding company must report 
to FIRB on compliance with the undertakings at least annually. 
2011 Target: Acquisition by Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. of 100% of Gloucestor Coal Ltd. 
(coal mining company) by Yancoal Australia by the issue of scrip in Yancoal Aus-
tralia and cash return valued at approximately AU$2.2 billion announced in De-
cember 2011. Gloucester shareholders received shares representing 23% of the en-
larged bidder. 




- Felix conditions to continue with following amendments; 
- Yancoal to list on ASX by end 2012 and Yanzhou’s ownership to be less 
than 70% by end 2013; 
- Reduce economic ownership in Syntech Resources and Premier Coal to 









                                                     
 
 142. Wayne Swan, ‘Foreign Investment Decision: Yancoal Australia Limited’s Merger with 
Gloucester Coal Limited Approved’ (Media Release, No. 009, Mar. 8, 2012) (Austl.), available at 
http://ministers.treasury.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=pressreleases/2012/009.htm&pageID=003&
min=wms&Year=&DocType=0. 
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Date Transaction 
2012 Target: Consortium acquisition by Shandong RuYi Scientific & Technological 
Group Co.
143
 with Lempriere Pty. Ltd. (an Australian investor) of the assets of 
Cubbie Group for an undisclosed price.
144
 
Application Status: Approval given August 31, 2012, subject to undertakings:
145
 
- RuYi to sell down interest from 80% to 51% to independent parties within 
3 years and ensure board representation is proportionate to its shareholding; 
- Cubbie to be managed by Lempriere and sell cotton at arms-length terms; 
- comply with law and offer to employ existing employees; and 
- investigate ways to improve water efficiency and sell surplus water alloca-
tions. 
VI. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH SOME OTHER KEY JURISDICTIONS 
The fact that Australia has grappled with the issue of FDI by SWFs 
and SOEs in recent years is not unique to western nations. The extent of 
regulation of FDI has been a growing issue in many jurisdictions over the 
last decade for the reasons advanced in the introduction. This Part con-
siders comparative analysis and case studies from some other similarly 
developed Western countries. 
Many jurisdictions, including a number of European countries, do 
not have a general statutory regime for regulating FDI but instead rely on 
more opaque general arrangements, such as the following:
146
 
1. Sectoral restrictions on foreign ownership in various key indus-
tries; 
2. Opaque regulatory approval requirements that apply to any con-
trol transaction in various key industries but where foreign 
ownership is discouraged as a practical matter in decision mak-
ing; 
                                                     
 
 143. A leading Chinese textile manufacturer owned by Chinese and Japanese investors. About 
Us, SHANDONG RU YI  GROUP, http://www.chinaruyi.com/doce/about/about.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 
2013) (China). 
 144. Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112. Cubbie Group owns substantial agricultural load in 
Southern Queensland and is involved in a variety of irrigated agricultural activities including the 
production of significant amounts of cotton. About Cubbie Ag, CUBBIE, http://www.cubbie.com. 
au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=61 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) 
(Austl.); Our Production, CUBBIE, http://www.cubbie.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&ta 
sk=view&id=13&Itemid=45 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (Austl.). 
 145. Cubbie Conditions, supra note 112. 
 146. For a detailed analysis of these factors and case studies, see ANDREA MANDEL-
CAMPBELL, CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., FOREIGN INVESTMENT REGIMES: HOW CANADA STACKS UP 
ch. 2 (2008), available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=2531. 
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3. Golden shares and unequal voting right mechanisms in corpo-
rate governance structures; and 
4. Political meddling in merger and acquisition transactions where 
political support is provided to local bidders to contest control 
proposals made by foreign bidders. 
 
The OECD measures the restrictiveness of national regimes for 
regulating inwards foreign direct investment and currently ranks Austral-
ia as the thirteenth most restrictive regime out of the more than forty-four 
countries surveyed, which included both member and some non-member 
states.
147
 If Australia were to abolish its screening processes, it has been 
suggested that Australia would be ranked towards the middle of OECD 
countries on these measures.
148
 
The OECD restrictiveness index does not seem to give a fair repre-
sentation of Australia’s relative position in regulating FDI. Pre-screening 
is not itself a significant impediment to FDI if the approval process is 
timely, transparent, and predictable. That would not always seem to be 
the case in jurisdictions that do not have a general foreign investment 
approval regime. 
A. United States of America 
Foreign investment in the United States is regulated by the Com-
mittee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
149
 The man-
                                                     
 
 147. Blanka Kalinova et al., OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index: 2010 Update 18 (OECD 
Working Papers on Int’l Inv., Paper No. 2010/03, 2010) (Fr.), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/ 
inv/investmentfordevelopment/45563285.pdf. An earlier survey had ranked Australia as the sixth 
most restrictive regime. OECD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 2007: FREEDOM OF 
INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 140 (2007), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-
Asset-Management/oecd/finance-and-investment/international-investment-perspectives-2007_iip-
2007-en. 
 148. See Sinclair Davidson et al., Submission to the Senate Inquiry into Investment by State-




 149. CFIUS is an interagency committee that works for the President . JAMES K. JACKSON, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (2013). CFIUS was initially established in 1975 by Presidential Executive Order. Id. The 
current CFIUS process arises from the 1988 “Exon–Florio” provision of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act, id. at 3–5, as amended in 1992 by the Byrd Amendment of the National De-
fense Act for Fiscal Year 1993, id., and in 2007 by the National Security Foreign Investment Reform 
and Strengthened Transparency Act. Id. at 7–8. The CFIUS regime is contained in section 721 of the 
Defense Production Act. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 721, 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170 (2012). 
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date of CFIUS is to review the national security implications of foreign 
investment.
150
 In this context “national security” extends to “critical in-
frastructure”
151
 and “critical technologies.”
152
 As such, the scope of the 
regime is narrower than the national interest criteria of Australia. 
A CFIUS review can be initiated by a voluntary filing by the Presi-
dent or by CFIUS.
153
 The advantage of a voluntary filing is the expecta-
tion that once a transaction is approved, it will be exempt from further 
review or action.
154
 The legislation applies to any “covered transaction,” 
meaning a merger, acquisition, or takeover that could result in a foreign 




Importantly, in the context of SWFs and SOEs, a review must be 
undertaken if the transaction involves an entity that is a foreign govern-
ment or one that is controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign gov-
ernment. 
When a CFIUS review is initiated, CFIUS has thirty days to review 
the transaction to determine its effects on the national security of the 
United States.
156
 If the review results in a determination that the transac-
tion threatens to impair national security and that threat has not yet been 
mitigated, CFIUS must conduct an investigation of the effects of the 
transaction within forty-five days and take any necessary actions to pro-
tect national security.
157
 After conducting that investigation, CFIUS must 
submit a report to Congress on the results of the investigation or submit 
the matter to the President for decision.
158
 The President has authority to 
take action within fifteen days to prohibit the transaction for such time as 
                                                     
 
 150. CFIUS consists of nine members—the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Homeland 
Security, Commerce and Energy, the Attorney General, the United States Trade Representative, and 
the Director of the Office of Science and Technology. The Secretary of Labor and Director of Na-
tional Security are ex officio members. JACKSON, supra note 149, at 8 n.31. 
 151. Critical infrastructure means systems and assets, physical or virtual, so vital that their 
incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on national security. 50 U.S.C. App. 
§ 2170(a)(6). 
 152. The definition of critical technologies includes critical technology, critical components, or 
critical technology essential to national security. Id. § 2170(a)(7). 
 153. Id. § 2170(b)(1)(C)–(D). 
 154. The legislation allows CFIUS to reopen a review if the person materially fails to comply 
with an arrangement entered into in relation to an approval or has provided false or misleading mate-
rial information. Id. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(ii). 
 155. Id. § 2170(a)(3). Control is defined in the Treasury Department regulations as a majority 
or dominant minority of voting securities, or the power to determine or decide certain specified 
decisions. 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a) (2008). 
 156. 50 U.S.C. App. § 2170(b)(1)(E). 
 157. Id. § 2170(b)(2)(A),(C). 
 158. Id. § 2170(b)(3)(B). 
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he considers appropriate if he finds credible evidence that a foreign con-
trolling interest might take action that threatens national security.
159
 The 
CFIUS Act lists a variety of factors that the President may take into ac-
count when considering national security, including the following:
160
 
 Domestic production needed for projected national defense re-
quirements; 
 Capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense re-
quirements; 
 Potential effects on sale of military materials to countries of 
concern; 
 Effects on critical infrastructure or critical technologies; and 
 Whether it is a foreign government controlled transaction. 
 
As a result of the rigidity of the thirty-forty-five-fifteen-day pro-
cess, CFIUS has developed a practice of allowing an informal prelimi-
nary stage of consultancy of unspecified length. This allows for addition-
al time to resolve concerns and confidentiality protections, particularly if 
a transaction would otherwise be publicly prohibited.
161
 
The number of transactions subject to CFIUS review is significant-
ly less than transactions subject to FIRB review, especially so consider-
ing the significantly smaller size of the Australian economy and mergers 
and acquisitions market. The most noteworthy recent development is the 
2012 presidential rejection of the Sany wind farm investment (see be-
low). Some broad statistics concerning the results of CFIUS review in 
recent years are as follows: 
 
Foreign Investment Transactions Reviewed by CFIUS, 2008–2010
162
 
                                                     
 
 159. Id. § 2170(d)(1)–(2). 
 160. Id. § 2170(f). 
 161. See JACKSON, supra note 149, at 7–8. 
 162. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. IN THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR 
CY 2010, at 3 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-
investment/Documents/2011%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL%20PUBLIC.pdf. 










2008 155 18 23 5 0 
2009 65 5 25 2 0 
2010 93 6 35 6 0 
Total 313 29 93 13 0 
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Some of the more contentious decisions made in connection with 
the CFIUS regime in recent years include the following: 
 
Date Transaction 
2000 Acquisition by NTT Communications (Japan) of Verio Inc. (firm providing inter-
net services) for US$5.5 billion. The transaction was approved by CFIUS. NTT 
was controlled by the Japanese government. CFIUS review was instigated by the 




2005 Proposed acquisition by CNOOC (Chinese SOE) of Unocal (oil producer) for 
US$18.5 billion. The proposal was withdrawn after the House of Representatives 
approved a provision that would have delayed the transaction and because of a 
likely CFIUS investigation. 
2005/ 
2006 
Proposed acquisition of commercial port operations by Dubai Ports World (an Arab 
SOE entity) from P&O for approximately US$6.7 billion. The transaction was ap-
proved by CFIUS without undertaking a forty-five day investigation.
164
 As a result 
of vocal criticism from members of Congress and the public, DPW disposed of the 
U.S. ports to AIG Global Investment Group (a U.S. asset manager) in 2006.
165
 
2006 Acquisition by Check Point Software Corp. (Israel) of Sourcefire, a specialist in 
security appliances for computer networks, for US$225 million. The transaction 
was terminated following CFIUS concerns.
166
 
2008 Proposed acquisition by Bain Capital and Huawei (China telecommunications 
company) of 3Com, a network and software provider, for US$2.2 billion. The 
transaction did not proceed after failure to negotiate a mitigation agreement with 
CFIUS. Certain 3Com software is used to protect the confidentiality of databases 
used by U.S. defense forces.
167
 
2009 Proposed investment by Northwest Non-Ferrous International Investment Co. to 
acquire 50.1% interest in First Gold Corp. for US$26 million. The proposal was 
withdrawn when CFIUS advised it would recommend the investment be blocked. 
First Gold was a junior mining company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(incorporated in the United States) that was seeking to develop gold mines adja-




                                                     
 
 163. JACKSON, supra note 149, at 9. 
 164. Id. at 25. 
 165. Id. at 1. 
 166. Id. at 9. 
 167. Id. at 19. 
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Date Transaction 
2010 Proposed investment by Tangshan Caofedian Investment Corp. (China) in Emcore, 
a maker of components for fibre optics and solar panels, valued at approximately 
US$54 million. The transaction was terminated following CFIS concerns.
168
 
2011 Proposed acquisition by Huawei (Chinese telecommunications company) of server 
assets of 3 Leaf (a technology company in bankruptcy) for US$2 million. The 
transaction was terminated following CFIUS’s advice that it would recommend 
the transaction be blocked.
169
 
2012 Proposed acquisition by Ralls Corp. (owned by executives of Sany of China) of 
several wind farms in Oregon. In September 2012, President Barak Obama signed 
an Executive Order prohibiting the acquisition, requiring the dismantling of Sany 





In October 2012, Sany commenced proceedings before the District Court of Co-
lumbia, challenging the President’s decision on the basis that it exceeded his pow-
ers under the CFIUS legislation, particularly in requiring the turbines be disman-
tled and not sold for use at the sites and on the basis that the action discriminated 
against Sany. Wind farms in the restricted air space area use turbines made by 
German and Danish companies, and some are owned by an Indian conglomerate. 
 
On February 26, 2013, Judge Amy Jackson dismissed Sany’s complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction on the basis that the CFIUS legislative provisions exempt Presidential 
actions from judicial review.
171
 Sany’s further complaint that due process required 
a more detailed explanation of the President’s findings was not struck, and that 
claim continued.
172
 Ralls Corp. has appealed the decision. 
2013 Acquisition by Wanxiang Group (China) of assets of A123 Systems, an electrical 
battery maker, out of bankruptcy for approximately US$250 million. Approved by 
CFIUS despite congressional criticism that the acquisition could jeopardize energy 




                                                     
 
 168. Id. at 9. 
 169. For details, see Ken Hu, Huawei Open Letter, HUAWEI (Feb. 25, 2011), http://pr.huawei. 
com/en/news/hw-092875-huaweiopenletter.htm#.UnVr9vmkqt- (China). 
 170. Press Release, White House, Order Signed by the President Regarding the Acquisition of 
Four US Wind Farm Projects by Ralls Corporation (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.whiteh 
ouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/28/order-signed-president-regarding-acquisition-four-us-wind-far 
m-project-c. 
 171. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 91 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 172. Id. at 95. 
 173. JACKSON, supra note 149, at 10. 
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The recent cases involving China demonstrate that CFIUS is strug-
gling with its review of Chinese investment to an even greater degree 
than is experienced in Australia.
174
 This was taking place at a time when 
Chinese FDI into the United States had matched Australia for the first 
time as the primary destination of Chinese investment in 2012.
175
 
There currently appears to be much greater political and community 
hostility to Chinese investment in the United States than there is in Aus-
tralia. The vituperative tone of the House of Representatives’ Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence regarding the telecommunications ac-
tivities of Huawei and ZTE of China (neither company is an SOE) and 
the suggestion that their sales of computer equipment are injurious to 
U.S. national security interests illustrate the level of suspicion that exists 




Foreign investment is primarily regulated in Canada under the In-
vestment Canada Act of 1985.
177
 Transactions that exceed certain control 
(equity) and monetary thresholds are reviewable and subject to approval 
by the Minister of Industry on the basis that the investment is likely to be 
of “net benefit” to Canada.
178
 The term net benefit is not defined but, 
when considered objectively, is likely to be a higher hurdle than Austral-
ia’s national interest test because of the need for the Minister to positive-
ly form that view of net benefit.
179
 Indeed, it is not sufficient that the in-
vestment continue the status quo; the investment must enhance the ability 
of the Canadian business to achieve the factors set out in the net benefit 
test.
180
 Of course, at the end of the day, each of these tests involves a 
                                                     
 
 174. See Greg Golding, Western Regulation of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment: Sany 
slapped by CFIUS, UNIV. NEW SOUTH WALES, CENTRE L., MKTS., & REGULATION (May 7, 2013), 
http://clmr.unsw.edu.au/article/accountability/berle-v/western-regulation-chinese-foreign-direct-
investment-sany-slapped-cfius. 
 175. Derek Scissors, China’s Global Investment Rises: The U.S. Should Focus on Competition, 
BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Found., Washington D.C.), Jan. 8, 2013, at 5, available at http://thf_med 
ia.s3.amazonaws.com/2013/pdf/bg2757.pdf. 
 176. STAFF OF H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 112TH CONG., 
INVESTIGATIVE REPORT ON THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES POSED BY CHINESE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES HUAWEI AND ZTE (2012). 
 177. Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 28 (1st Supp.). The author thanks Julie Soloway 
of Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLC, Canada, for her comments on this section. 
 178. Id. § 21(1). 
 179. Compare the debate in Australia in 1975 when a net economic benefit test was proposed 
in Part IV, supra. 
 180. BRIAN A. FACEY & JOSHUA A. KRANE, INVESTMENT CANADA ACT: COMMENTARY AND 
ANNOTATION 54 (Lexis 2013). 
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very subjective political decision-making process rather than a reviewa-
ble objective standard. 
Investment Canada review applies to the acquisition of control by a 
non-Canadian person of a Canadian business or the establishment of a 
new business.
181
 Control is defined such that the acquisition of 50% or 
more of voting interests in any form of business association is deemed to 
be control. The acquisition of 33.3% or more—but less than 50%—of 
voting shares in a Canadian corporation is presumed to be an acquisition 
of control, unless there is evidence to the contrary and the acquisition of 
less than 33.3 % of voting interests is deemed not to be control.
182
 A 
threshold amount applies to reviewable transactions indexed each year; 
in 2013, the threshold was C$344  for a World Trade Organization 
(WTO) member.
183
 The general threshold is set to be increased substan-
tially in 2013 to an enterprise value of C$600 million, rising to C$1 bil-
lion over four years, where the acquisition is made by a WTO member.
184
 
The filing of an application for review triggers a process under 
which the Minister generally has forty-five days to make a decision,
185
 
unilaterally extendable by thirty days or longer by agreement. As the 
case studies below demonstrate, a thirty-day extension following the ex-
pression of a “no net benefit” opinion has significant implications to the 
implementation of a transaction: The extension may allow an opportunity 
for the investor to persuade the Minister that the investment is of net 
benefit. Applications are generally reviewed and administered by the 
Investment Review Division of Industry Canada.
186
 In considering the  
 
                                                     
 
 181. Investment Canada Act §§ 11, 14(1). 
 182. Id. §§ 14(2), 28(3). 
 183. Investment Canada Act: Amount for the Year 2013, 147 C. Gaz. pt. I 52 (Can.). Much 
lower thresholds apply for direct and indirect acquisitions of control where the investor and the 
entity controlling the Canadian business are not WTO investors. Investment Canada Act §§ 14(3)–
(4). 
 184. Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 1, S.C. 2013, c. 33, § 137 (Can.). For non-WTO 
entities the threshold is C$5 million. Investment Canada Act § 14(3). A different regime applies to 
SOEs. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. See generally Julie Soloway & Charles Layton, 
Foreign Investment Review in Canada: Assessing Risk in the Wake of Nexen, COMPETITION POL’Y 
INST. ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2013, available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/ 
foreign-investment-review-in-canada-assessing-risk-in-the-wake-of-nexen/. 
 185. Investment Canada Act § 21(1). 
 186. INDUSTRY CAN., INVESTMENT CANADA ACT ANNUAL REPORT 2009–2010, at 9 (2010). 
However, transactions involving cultural issues are handled by the Department of Canadian Herit-
age. Id. at 11. 
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1. The effect of the investment on the level and nature of econom-
ic activity in Canada; 
2. The participation of Canadians in the business; 
3. The effect on productivity, industrial efficiency, technological 
development, product innovation, and variety in Canada; 
4. The effect on competition in Canada; 
5. The compatibility with national industrial, economic, and cul-
tural policies; and 
6. The impact on Canada’s ability to compete in world markets. 
 
A separate regime applies to investments involving national securi-
ty concerns. If the Minister has reasonable grounds to believe that an in-
vestment by a non-Canadian could be injurious to national security, the 
investment can be prohibited.
188
 In this situation, there is no monetary 
threshold. The term “injurious to national security” is not defined and is 
much more ambiguous in its scope compared to, for example, the CFIUS 
regime. 
A special regime has applied to SOE investment since 2007, with 
important revisions in 2012.
189
 An SOE is defined as an enterprise 
owned, controlled, or influenced by a foreign government. The C$ 
threshold for investment by SOEs is a book value of assets of C$344 mil-
lion for 2013 and will remain unchanged as the general review threshold 
increases. The guidelines specify that, in considering net benefit, the 
Minister will consider the corporate governance and reporting structure 
of the SOE, including whether the SOE adheres to Canadian standards of 
corporate governance, Canadian laws, and practices and to free market 
principles. Further, the Minister will assess whether the SOE will operate 
on a commercial basis, including where to export, where to process, par-
ticipation of Canadians in management, support for innovation, and lev-
els of capital expenditure. SOEs are expected to give undertakings to 
                                                     
 
 187. Investment Canada Act § 20. 
 188. Id. §§ 25.2, 25.4. 
 189. INDUSTRY CAN., GUIDELINES—INVESTMENT BY STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: NET 
BENEFIT ASSESSMENT (2012), available at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk00064.h 
tml#p2. The guidelines were amended on December 7, 2012. Press Release, Industry Canada, Gov-
ernment of Canada Releases Policy Statement and Revised Guidelines for Investments by State-
Owned Enterprises (Dec. 7, 2012), available at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=711489. 
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satisfy the Minister so that the above-referenced principles will be 
achieved through the investment. 
The regime described above has developed against a backdrop of 
public debate about the appropriate scope of regulation and the role of 
FDI in shaping the Canadian economy. Canada has been particularly 
anxious that key industries are being “hollowed out,” with industry 
champions being acquired by foreign persons, and head offices and jobs 
increasingly going offshore.
190
 In the hollowing out debate, Canada has 
had more to fear from United States FDI than SOE investment in Cana-
dian resources. 
Some of the major transactions that have shaped this debate in Can-
ada are as follows: 
 
Date Transaction 
2008 Proposed acquisition by Alliant Techsystems Inc. (U.S.) of space technology 
division of MacDonald, Dettwiler & Associates for C$1.3 billion blocked by 
the Minister.
191
 The basis of the decision was the loss of important technology 
to Canada and a threat to Canadian surveillance of disputed arctic territory. 
This was the first investment blocked under the Investment Canada Act.
192
 
2009 Proposed acquisition by George Forrest International of Forsys Metals Corp. (a 
Namibian uranium producer) for C$585 million. The proposal was terminated 
in contentious circumstances following receipt of advice from Investment Can-




                                                     
 
 190. See MICHAEL GRANT & MICHAEL BLOOM, CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., “HOLLOWING 
OUT”—MYTH AND REALITY: CORPORATE TAKEOVERS IN AN AGE OF TRANSFORMATION 1–2 
(2008), available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/abstract.aspx?did=2414. 
 191. Press Release, Industry Canada, Minister of Industry Confirms Initial Decision on Pro-
posed Sale of MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. to Alliant Techsystems Inc. (May 8, 2008), 
available at http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=25412. 
 192. The investment was blocked on “net benefit” grounds and not on “national security” 
grounds, see id., as the latter regime did not enter into force until 2009; however, public proceedings 
following the decision confirmed that national security was the motivating factor behind the Minis-
ter’s decision. Matt Hartley, Alliant to Press Ottawa Over MDA Veto, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 14, 
2008), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/alliant-to-press-ottawa-over-mda-veto/ 
article1054382/. 
 193. Press Release, Forsys Metals Corp., GFI Investment Update (Aug. 19, 2009), available at 
http://forsysmetals.com/PDF/News_2009/NR%20081909.pdf. In 2011, Wikileaks released docu-
ments suggesting U.S. and Canadian diplomatic concerns that GFI may supply uranium to Iran. 
Gordon Rayner, WikiLeaks: Sale of Uranium Mine Blocked over Iran Fears, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 3, 
2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8299360/WikiLeaks-Sale-of-uranium 
-mine-blocked-over-Iran-fears.html (U.K.). 
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 194. Press Release, Industry Canada, Industry Minister Clement Confirms BHP Billiton’s 
Withdrawal of its Application for Review Under the Investment Canada Act (Nov. 14, 2010), avail-
able at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/064.nsf/eng/06068.html. 
 195. Press Release, BHP Billiton, BHP Billiton Withdraws Its Offer to Acquire Potash Corp. 
and Reactivates Its Buy-Back Program (Nov. 15, 2010), available at http://www.bhpbilliton.com/ 
home/investors/news/Pages/Articles/BHP%20Billiton%20Withdraws%20Its%20Offer%20To%20A
cquire%20PotashCorp%20And%20Reactivates%20Its%20Buy-back%20Program.aspx. 
 196. Press Release, Industry Canada, Minister of Industry Confirms Notice Sent to 
PETRONAS Carigali Canada Ltd. Regarding Proposed Acquisition of Progress Energy Resources 
Corp. (Oct. 19, 2012), available at http://finance.yahoo.com/news/minister-industry-confirms-
notice-sent-035735659.html. 
 197. Press Release, Industry Canada, Petronas’ Acquisition of Progress (Dec. 7, 2012), availa-
ble at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=711509. 
 198. Press Release, Industry Canada, CNOOC Limited’s Acquisition of Nexen Inc. (Dec. 7, 
2012), available at http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=711499. 
Date Transaction 
2010 Proposed acquisition by BHP Billiton of Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan Inc. 
(a significant global producer of potash) for C$43 billion. The proposal was 
withdrawn following a preliminary finding by the Minister that the invest-
ment was not likely to be of net benefit and an invitation to make further 
submissions to the Minister within thirty days.
194
 BHP had proposed various 
capital expenditure commitments, Canadian employment commitments, and 
community programs to satisfy the net benefit test.
195
 
2012 Proposed acquisition by Petronas (Malaysian SOE) of Progress Energy Re-
sources Corp. (an oil and gas exploration and production company) for 
C$5.2 billion. On October 19, 2012, the Minister advised Petronas that he 
was not satisfied that the investment would likely be of net benefit and in-
vited further submissions within 30 days.
196
 On Dec. 7, 2012, the Minister 
advised that the investment was likely to be of net benefit.
197
 The Minister’s 
press release indicated undertakings had been given in the areas of transpar-
ency and disclosure; adherence to free market principles and to Canadian 
laws and practices; and employment and capital investments. Petronas had 
previously advised that it planned to combine its Canadian business with 
Progress and retain all employees of Progress. 
2012 Proposed acquisition by CNOOC Ltd. (Chinese SOE) of Nexen Ltd. (signif-
icant oil sands explorer and producer) for C$14 billion. On Dec. 7, 2012, 
the Minister advised that he was satisfied that the investment would likely 
of net benefit to Canada.
198
 The Minister’s press release indicated undertak-
ings has been given in the areas of transparency and disclosure, adherence 
to free market principles and to Canadian laws and practices; and employ-
ment and capital investments. CNOOC previously advised that it planned to 
establish Calgary as its American head office, retain Nexen’s expenditure 
plans, list on the Toronto Stock Exchange, and support oil sands research. 
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The record outlined above illustrates a trend towards increased 
scrutiny of high profile transactions in Canada over the last few years. In 
some ways, the debate in Canada in 2012 mirrored the Australian experi-
ence in 2009, both at a policy and political level. At the same time as 
announcing the last two approvals listed above, the Minister announced 
various changes to the regime as well as to the SOE policy. In particular, 
the Minister advised that the future acquisition of control of a Canadian 




There is a concern in some Canadian quarters that the regulatory 
regime is calibrated too harshly against foreign investors, particularly 
Chinese SOEs, and that Canada has been losing foreign direct investment 
to other countries that have better dealt with Chinese FDI, particularly 
Australia.
200
 The legislative framework of the Canadian regime is clearly 
more restrictive in its scope than that of Australia.  It has therefore been 




1. Replace the net benefit test with a contrary to national interests 
test (i.e., the Australian test); 
2. Include in the SOE standards guidelines undertakings at arm’s 
length marketing and international price benchmarks; 
3. Explicitly state that Canada has a national interest in companies 
operating on a commercial basis under the laws of Canada; 
4. Recognize the economic importance of resources mergers and 
acquisitions; and 
5. Engage with Chinese companies and make them aware of Ca-
nadian sensitivities and requirements to develop a model of 
Chinese investment in Canada. 
                                                     
 
 199. INDUSTRY CAN., STATEMENT REGARDING INVESTMENT BY FOREIGN STATE-OWNED 
ENTERPRISES  (2012), available at  http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ica-lic.nsf/eng/lk81147.html. 
 200. See MICHAEL GRANT, CONFERENCE BD. OF CAN., FEAR THE DRAGON? CHINESE FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA (2012), available at http://www.conferenceboard.ca/e-library/ 
abstract.aspx?did=4884; Josephine Smart, Dancing with the Dragon: Canadian Investment in China 
and Chinese Investment in Canada, UNIV. CALGARY SCH. PUBLIC POL’Y, Sept. 2012, at 1, available 
at http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/sites/default/files/research/smart-dancing-dragon-final.pdf. 
 201. GRANT, supra note 200, at 25–26. 
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C. New Zealand 
Foreign investment in New Zealand is regulated by the Overseas 
Investment Act 2005.
202
 Reviewable transactions are assessed by the 
Minister of Finance and Minister for Land Information based on a varie-
ty of prescriptive criteria, including “likely” benefit for New Zealand 
where sensitive land is involved.
203
 The Overseas Investment Office re-
view applies to transactions that result in overseas investment in signifi-
cant business assets or overseas investments in sensitive land.
204
 The Act 
proceeds on the basis that it is a “privilege” for overseas persons to own 
or control sensitive New Zealand assets.
205




Overseas investment in significant business assets is defined as the 
acquisition by an overseas person of a 25% or more ownership or control 
interest where the value of the securities acquired exceeds NZ$100 mil-
lion, the establishment of a business by an overseas person involving 
expenditures exceeding NZ$100 million, or the acquisition of a foreign 
person of property used in carrying on a business exceeding NZ$100 
million.
207
 An overseas investment in sensitive land is defined as the ac-
quisition by an overseas person of land that is scheduled as sensitive 
land, or a 25% ownership or control interest in a person that owns an in-
terest in such sensitive land.
208
 For these purposes, a 25% or more own-
ership or control interest is a beneficial interest in 25% or more of securi-
ties, the power to control the composition of 25% or more of the govern-
ing body, or the right to exercise 25% or more of voting power.
209
 
                                                     
 
 202. Overseas Investment Act 2005 (N.Z.); Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, SR 
2005/220 (N.Z.). 
 203. Overseas Investment Act 2005 § 16(e)(ii). 
 204. Id. § 10(1). A separate regime applies to the acquisition of fishing quotas. Id. § 10(2). 
 205. Id. § 3. 
 206. New Zealand legislation has historically discouraged the undue aggregation of land. Heat-
ley & Howell, supra note 5, at 22. The predecessor Overseas Investment Act 1973 had dealt with 
investment in businesses and the Land Settlement Promotion and Land Acquisition Act 1952 had 
dealt with the purchase of farm land. 
 207. Overseas Investment Act 2005 § 13(1). For Australian non-government investors, the 
threshold is increased to NZ $477 million in 2013 (indexed for inflation thereafter). Overseas In-
vestment Regulations 2005, SR 2005/220, reg 36(A), sch 5 (N.Z.). 
 208. Overseas Investment Act 2005 § 12. Schedule 1 lists various categories of land, including 
non-urban land exceeding five hectares; land on islands or lake beds; heritage order land; historic 
places exceeding 0.4 hectares;  land adjoining foreshore exceeding 0.2 hectares; land adjacent to 
historic areas, parks, seas, lakes; or heritage areas exceeding 0.4 hectares. The Act also extends to a 
situation where an owner of land becomes an overseas person. Id. § 12(b)(iii). 
 209. Id. § 6(4). 
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An overseas “person” is an individual who is neither a New Zea-
land citizen nor a resident, or a company where overseas persons have 
25% or more of securities, the power to control the composition of 25% 
or more of the governing body, or the right to exercise 25% or more of 
voting power.
210
 The restrictions apply to both transactions involving 
foreign persons and their associates.
211
 
Transactions subject to review must be notified to the Overseas In-
vestment Office before the overseas investment is given effect.
212
 The 
regime does not provide for time limits in which consent must be given. 
Applications are generally processed and approved by the Overseas In-
vestment Office under delegated authority, with more significant deci-
sions made by the relevant Ministers.
213
 The regime provides a mecha-
nism for approvals to be given subject to conditions.
214
 
Where the transaction involves significant business assets, the crite-
ria for review are the business experience acumen of the person, the fi-
nancial commitment demonstrated by the person, and the good character 
of the person (the character test).
215
 Much more extensive economic re-
view criteria apply to transactions involving sensitive land, in addition to 
the criteria above: 
 The person must intend to reside in New Zealand, or the decid-
ing authority must find that the investment will or is likely to 
“benefit New Zealand,” and if the transaction involves non-




 If the transaction involves farmland, the land must have been 




The “benefit to New Zealand” analysis requires the Ministers to 
consider a range of additional factors, including job opportunities, intro-
                                                     
 
 210. Id. § 7(2). Similar definitions apply to partnerships and trusts. 
 211. This extends to persons controlling a person and persons acting in concert. Id. § 8. 
 212. Id. § 11. Failure to obtain consent is an offense, id. § 42, and an investment made without 
consent may be cancelled by a party to the transaction who does not need consent or by a court on 
application of the regulator. Id. § 29(1)(c). 
 213. Id. §§ 30–37. Business decisions are made by the Minister of Finance. Sensitive land 
decisions are made by the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Land Information. Legislation, 
Ministers & Delegated Powers, LAND INFO. NEW ZEALAND, http://www.linz.govt.nz/overseas-
investment/ about-oio/legislation-delegations (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). 
 214. Overseas Investment Act 2005 §25(1)(c). 
 215. Id. § 18. 
 216. Id. § 16(1)(e). 
 217. Id. § 16(1)(f); Overseas Investment Regulations 2005, SR 2005/220, regs 4–11. 
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duction of new technology, export impacts, productivity impact, impact 
on development investment, impact on processing primary products, 
likelihood of resulting improved relations with another country, impact 
on New Zealand’s image, impact on important infrastructure, involve-
ment of New Zealand, impact on government policy and strategy, protec-
tion of historic heritage, wildlife, and indigenous fauna, and whether 
foreshore, seabed, or riverbed has been offered to the crown.
218
 
In New Zealand, no separate regime applies to SWFs or SOEs. 
Some of the more contentious decisions made under the New Zealand 
regime in recent years are listed below. As with other Western screening 





2008 Proposed acquisition by Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board of a 40% 
investment in Auckland International Airport Limited for NZ$1.75 bil-
lion.
220
 The proposal led to significant political debate as to whether SWF 
investment of this kind should be permitted in this kind of infrastructure 
asset. The debate resulted in the inclusion of the strategic infrastructure test 
in the Regulations. The transaction was rejected by the Minister on the basis 





Acquisition by Haier (Chinese SOE) of 100% of Fisher & Paykel Applianc-
es, a white goods manufacturer, for NZ$740 million. Haier had initially ac-








                                                     
 
 218. Overseas Investment Act 2005 §17(2); Overseas Investment Regulations SR 2005/220, 
reg 28. A detailed business plan must be submitted with the application addressing the benefit test. 
 219. Between 2006 and 2010 the Overseas Investment Office refused fourteen out of the 738 
applications made. Peter Enderwick, Inward FDI in New Zealand and Its Policy Context, VALE 
COLUMBIA CTR. ON SUSTAINABLE INT’L INV., 4 (July 17, 2012), http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/ 
vale/documents/NZ_IFDI_17_July_2012_-_FINAL.pdf. 
 220. The summary of this transaction is taken from Heatley & Howell, supra note 5, at 41–46. 
 221. Overseas Investment Act 2005: Reasons for Decisions by Relevant Ministers, OVERSEAS 
INV. OFFICE,  6 (April 11, 2008), http://www.linz.govt.nz/docs/miscellaneous/min-decisions.pdf 
(N.Z.). This decision was made despite the fact that the investment was approved by Auckland In-
ternational Airports’ shareholders and would have resulted in private gains accruing to New Zealand 
investors. Id. 
 222. Decision Summary Case: 201220035, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Oct. 30, 2012), 
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseas-investment/decisions/2012-10/c2012200 
35.pdf (N.Z.). 




Acquisition by Agria Corp. (Chinese NYSE listed agricultural company) 
with New Hope Group (Chinese private agribusiness company) and Maori 
investment entity of an aggregate 51% interest in PGG Wrightson, an agri-
cultural services company, for NZ$250 million. Approved.
223
 
2010 Acquisition by Bright Dairy & Food Co. (Chinese SOE) of a 51% share-




2010 Proposed acquisition by Natural Dairy
225
 of Crafar Farms, one of New Zea-
land’s largest dairy farms, for an undisclosed consideration.
226
 The proposal 




2012 Proposed acquisition by Milk New Zealand Holdings Ltd.
228
 of Crafar 
Farms for an undisclosed consideration. The proposal was approved based 




This decision was subject to legal challenge by a potential rival New Zea-
land purchaser and Maori land trust. The legal challenge failed, despite a 
finding that aspects of the decision required reconsideration.
230
 In that re-
spect, the comparison with the U.S. Ralls
231
 litigation is of interest. 
                                                     
 
 223. Decision Summary Case: 201110005, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Apr. 15, 2011), 
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseas-investment/decisions/2011-04/c20111 
0005.pdf (N.Z.); Decision Summary Case: 200920070, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Nov. 16, 2009), 
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2009-
11/C200920070.pdf (N.Z.). 
 224.  Decision Summary Case: 201020022, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/2010-
09/c201020022.pdf (N.Z.). 
 225. Bright Dairy & Food Co. is a company controlled by Chinese nationals. Corporate Pro-
file, NATURAL DAIRY (NZ) HOLDINGS LTD., http://www.naturaldairy.hk/index.php?route=aboutus/ 
aboutus&aboutus_id=1 (last visited Oct. 13, 2013) (China). 
 226. The farms were in administration. Receivers Running the Ruler over Crafar Farms Bids, 
NAT’L BUS. REV. (July 8, 2010), http://www.nbr.co.nz/article/receivers-running-ruler-over-crafar-
farms-bids-125824 (N.Z.). The comparison to the Australian experience with Cubbie station is appo-
site. 
 227. Decision Summary Case: 201010030/201020032, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Dec. 22, 
2010), http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/overseas-investment/decisions/decision-summaries/ 
2010-12/c201010030-201020032.pdf (N.Z.). 
 228. An entity controlled by a Chinese national. Decision Summary Case: 201110035, 
OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseas-
investment/decisions/2012-04/c201110035.pdf (N.Z.). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Tiroa E and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information [2012] NZHC 147 
(N.Z.); Tiroa E and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information [2012] NZCA 
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Date Transaction 
2013 Proposed acquisition by China Forest Group Corp. (Chinese SOE) of part 
of the forestry assets of NZ Superannuation Fund for an undisclosed con-
sideration. The proposal was approved
232
 with the imposition of conditions 
requiring the appointment of New Zealand persons to the board of the ac-
quirer and the provision of student scholarships in New Zealand. 
 
The New Zealand regime is not without its significant policy per-
versities. As applied to FDI, application of the stricter economic review 
criteria entirely depends on whether the investee company owns sensitive 
land, even though that sensitive land may be peripheral to the activities 
of the investee.
233
 Similarly, transactions have been blocked where for-
eign-to-foreign transactions involve sensitive land assets that are some-
what peripheral to the business being conducted.
234
 
That being said, there are some aspects of the New Zealand regime 
that are of interest to an Australian observer: 
 Simply expressed legislation; 
 Comprehensive identification of the economic factors to be ap-
plied in the decision-making process; 
 Transparent reporting of factors considered in making a deci-
sion; 




VII. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
The Australian review process is structurally designed to facilitate 
the approval of the overwhelming majority of investment applications. 
Some have argued that Australia’s regime imposes a measurable cost 
 
355(N.Z.); Tiroa E Hape and Te Hape B Trusts v Chief Executive of Land Information [2012] NZSC 
85 (N.Z.). 
 231. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 91 
(D.D.C. 2013). 
 232. Decision Summary Case: 201220072, OVERSEAS INV. OFFICE (Mar. 21, 2013), 
http://www.linz.govt.nz/sites/default/files/docs/overseas-investment/decisions/2013-03/c2012200 
72.pdf (N.Z.). 
 233. Heatley & Howell, supra note 5, at 48–49 (discussing case study). 
 234. Id. at 49–51. 
 235. N.Z. TRADE & ENTER. & MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, OPENING DOORS TO 
CHINA: NEW ZEALAND’S 2015 VISION, at 25 (2012),  available at  http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloa 
ds/NZinc/NZInc-%20Strategy%20-%20China.pdf (Strategic Goal 4 is to “[i]ncrease bilateral in-
vestment to levels that reflect the growing commercial relationship with China”). 
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through rejection, excessive conditions imposed on transactions and in-
vestments deferred by the regime.
236
 Those claims seem overblown. As 
the case studies and statistics outlined above demonstrate, the reality is 
that the Australian record is strong in facilitating and encouraging FDI. 
It can be argued that the structure of the Australian regime does not 
sit well with Australia’s obligations under the OECD regime (particular-
ly the 2009 Recommendations) in the following areas: 
 The OECD Council recommends that transparency and predict-
ability requires that there be strict time limits applied to review 
procedures for foreign investments. The experience with some 
of the Chinese SOE investments since 2008 does not suggest a 
high degree of correlation with this recommendation. 
 The OECD Council recommends that, based on proportionality, 
investment decisions be narrowly focused on concerns relating 
to national security. The national interest criteria in Australia 
are certainly much broader and more opaque than that standard. 
 The OECD Council recommends, based on accountability prin-
ciples, that there be the possibility for foreign investors to seek 
review of decisions to restrict foreign investment through ad-
ministrative procedures or before judicial or administrative 
courts. The Australian regime does not reflect such a feature. 
 
Moving from these concerns, there are a number of areas that could be 
advanced by the Australian government to better advance the regulation 
of FDI consistent with the OECD principles. 
First, it is clear that regulating FDI is an issue of global concern and 
involves an ongoing dialogue in globalized markets. Bodies such as the 
OECD and the IMF have made substantial contributions to this debate in 
recent years. The Australian government should renew its efforts for in-
ternational consensus on these issues and, over time, move its policy set-
tings to reflect that consensus.
237
 Linked to this should be increased inter-
governmental dialogue by Australia, particularly with BRIC nations that 
have large SOE sectors, in an effort to improve understanding of the 
                                                     
 
 236. In 2008, ITS Global estimated that Australia’s regulatory regime costs the Australian 
economy at least $5.5 billion a year through delays or deterrence of foreign investment. Foreign 
Direct Investment in Australia—The Increasing Cost of Regulation, ITS GLOBAL, 21–22 (Sept. 9, 
2008), http://www.itsglobal.net/sites/default/files/itsglobal/Research%20Report%20on%20Foreign% 
20Direct%20Investment%20and%20the%20Increasing%20Cost%20of%20Regulation%20in%20Au
stralia%20%282008%29.pdf (N.Z.); see also Kirchner, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 237. It is interesting to note that each of the comparative regimes described above specify the 
relevant factors that should be considered in making decisions. 
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concerns on both sides.
238
 Rather than removing the byzantine edifice of 
the existing statutory regime in the short-term, the focus of government 
action should be to embrace OECD and IMF best practices in the practi-
cal implementation of its decision making.
239
 Long-term best results 
would entail Australia’s embrace of best practice global trends, removing 
a national interest test and replacing it with narrower national security 
tests.
240
 But it should be consistent with greater global consensus around 
these issues. 
Second, the dollar thresholds under the Act could be raised to a 
much higher level, as has been the recent experience in Canada.
241
 This 
should be true of general investment as well as SWF and SOE invest-
ment. Third, there could be less reliance on conditions and more reliance 
on domestic regulation to regulate commercial behavior. The imposition 




As to the issues surrounding strategic FDI by Chinese SOEs in 
Australia, the recent developments in the Australia–China relationship 




                                                     
 
 238. See Peter Drysdale, Australia: Time to Adapt, E. ASIA FORUM Q., Apr.–June 2012, at 31, 
32. 
 239. Simplifying the byzantine structure would, of course, be desirable if politically achieva-
ble. Each of the comparative regimes described above are good case studies of simpler regulation. 
 240. Steven Kirchner suggests that the Act and related legislation should be amended to re-
place the current national interest test with distinct “national security” and “national economic wel-
fare” tests. The Federal Cabinet should rule on investment proposals raising specific national securi-
ty concerns. All other foreign direct investment proposals should be considered by an independent 
statutory body subject to a national economic welfare test that would be binding on the government 
of the day and be subject to administrative and judicial review. Kirchner, supra note 6, at 17–18. 
 241. See id. at 18. The Canadian approach of linking a higher review threshold to WTO mem-
bership has much to commend it. 
 242. Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 19; Kirchner, supra note 6, at 18; Drysdale, supra note 
238, at 31–32. 
 243. Some suggestions to develop better trust include improved communication and engage-
ment; enhanced cooperation in key investment sectors; and the conclusion of the Australia–China 
Free Trade Agreement. See Larum & Qian, supra note 43, at 18–22; see also supra Part VI.C (dis-
cussing the New Zealand approach). 
